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"WHICH IS TO BE MASTER," THE JUDICIARY
OR THE LEGISLATURE? WHEN STATUTORY DIRECTIVES
VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
*

Linda D. Jellum
Statutory interpretationis at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now,
legislative activity. As legislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as
activist meddlers, some legislatures have found a creative solution to the perceived
control problem: statutory directives. Statutory directives, simply put, tell judges
how to interpret statutes. Rather than wait for an interpretationwith which they
disagree, legislatures use statutory directives to control judicial interpretation.
Legislatures are constitutionally empowered to draft statutes. In doing so,
legislatures expect to control the meaning of the words they choose. Moreover, they
prefer to do so early in the process, not after a judge has interpreted the statute in a
way they did not expect or intend. Judges are constitutionally empowered to
interpret statutes without legislative micromanagement. The question, then, is how
to balance these valid, but competing, constitutional roles. This Article
explores when statutory directives disrupt this balance and violate separation of
powers. The Article concludes that when the legislature tries to control the process
of interpretation,as opposed to trying to influence the outcome of interpretationto
promote specific policy objectives, the legislature aggrandizes itself, oversteps
constitutional boundaries, impermissibly intrudes into the judicial sphere, and
becomes master of the interpretiveprocess.
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INTRODUCTION

In Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty and Alice contemplated
the power of speech:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be masterthat's all."'

1.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 190 (Oxford University Press 1982) (187 1).
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With his parting response, Humpty suggested that the one who speaks
has more power than the one who listens. Words, in his view, can mean
whatever the speaker wants them to mean, "neither more nor less."
Humpty's view has powerful implications for our system of government
in which the legislature "speaks," or writes, laws that the judiciary later
"hears," or interprets. Legislatures are constitutionally empowered to draft statutes. Hence, they expect to control the meaning of these statutes. Moreover,
they would prefer to do so early in the process, not after a judge has interpreted
the statute in a way they did not expect or intend. Judges are constitutionally
empowered to interpret statutes and would prefer to do so without legislative micromanagement. The question, then, is how to balance these valid
but competing constitutional roles. Placed in this context, Humpty's
response-"which is to be master"-implies a binary choice, either of which
would be undesirable. The legislature and judiciary share responsibility for
the interpretive process, acting as partners in an ongoing dialogue. But Humpty's
response reminds us of the potential risk that should one branch overstep its
role, that branch could well become master of the other. In this ongoing
dialogue between courts and legislatures, there are constitutional limits to the
ways in which one branch may attempt to control the role of the other.2 This
Article explores those limits.
Statutory interpretation is at the cutting edge of legislative activity. As
legislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers,
some legislatures have found a creative solution: statutory directives. Statutory
directives, simply put, instruct judges how to interpret statutes.' Rather than
wait for an interpretation with which they disagree, legislatures use statutory
directives to influence judges prior to judicial interpretation. For example, imagine that the U.S. Congress enacted the following three statutory directives:

2.
Interpretation is a cooperative venture, and either side can be guilty of abusive practices.
For example, absent underlying constitutional considerations, judicial decrees that the U.S. Congress
must be explicit if it wishes to achieve certain results, such as the one in, Crawford Fitting Co. v. .T.
Gibbons Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987), are just as problematic as would be some congressional
instructions to judges, such as one that legislative history is to be given preference over statutory text.
Crawford Fitting's requirement of an explicit statement, ungrounded in statutory text, presaged years
of continuing battle between the courts and Congress over the question of when exactly successful
litigants were entitled to recoup elements of their expense. See W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 112 n.11 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The judiciary might well overstep its role by
deciding what the law shall be despite Congress's statute. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles
of Statutory Interpretation,68 U. CHI. L. REv. 149 (2001), in which the author has put the judiciallegislative back-and-forth in a historical perspective and suggests persuasive reasons for resisting
either side's effort to rigidify the process.
3.
See discussion infra Part II.
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1. For all Acts of Congress, the word "marriage" means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife.'
2. All Acts of Congress shall be broadly construed with a view
to promote the Act's purposes and carry out the intent of
the legislature; the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply.
Moreover, the rule of the common law that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed has no application. All statutes
are to be construed according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to further their purposes and to.
promote justice.
3. The meaning of a statute shall be ascertained from the text
of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
after examining the text and such other relationships, the
meaning of the text is plain and unambiguous and does
not yield absurd results, the judiciary shall not consider
extratextual evidence.
Would the U.S. Supreme Court find these statutory directives
constitutional under the separation of powers doctrine? The three directives are

very different. The first directive merely defines terms. The second directive
tries to control the interpretive outcome. The third directive tries to control
the interpretive process. Is there a difference in the constitutionality of these
statutory directives under separation of powers analysis?
This Article explores that question and concludes that there is a
difference. Some directives are legitimate instances of legislative involvement

in the interpretive dialogue, while others are unconstitutional attempts to
usurp judicial power. The legislature may legitimately try to influence the
interpretive outcome to promote specific policy choices. However, when
attempting to control the interpretive process without regard for policy
choices, the legislature aggrandizes itself and violates separation of powers.
In analyzing this issue, this Article explores the intersection of two
important legal doctrines: separation of powers and statutory interpretation.
The separation of powers doctrine lacks judicial clarity and resolution, as the
Court has yet to "develop a sophisticated theory of the underlying philosophy
of our structure of government."' In fact, "the Supreme Court has failed for over
two hundred years... to develop a law of separation of powers." Statutory
4.
This directive actually exists in slightly different form at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
5. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 506, 509 (1989).
6.
Id.at 507.
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interpretation similarly lacks clarity and resolution. Indeed, Justice Scalia
once sarcastically commented, "I thought we had adopted a regular method
for interpreting the meaning of a.. . statute. . . ."'-highlighting the Supreme
Court's history of grappling to find the appropriate approach to statutory
interpretation, without ever settling on one.' Because the justices cannot
agree, there is an interpretive vacuum, and Congress has an incentive to make
the decision itself.
Despite this. vacuum, Congress should not step in. In this Article, I show
why some statutory directives violate separation of powers, while others do
not. In Part 1, I use examples from two states to illustrate the problem.' Yet
this issue is not confined to the states; Congress is similarly crafting such
directives."o In Part II, I divide statutory directives into three categories,
illustrated by the hypothetical directives above: definitional, interpretive, and
theoretical." Understanding the distinctions between these categories is essential in determining which types of directives violate separation of powers.
Next, in Part III, I describe the historical development of the separation
of powers doctrine and the two dominant approaches: formalism and functionalism." While, I do not attempt to evaluate these approaches, I do suggest that fears of tyranny and legislative aggrandizement underlie these
divergent approaches and can provide useful principles for guiding the analysis. Finally, after describing the principles of separation of powers, I analyze
in Part IV whether the various types of statutory directives violate either of
these approaches." I conclude that definitional directives are legitimate exercises of congressional involvement in the interpretive process, while theoretical
directives are likely unconstitutional attempts to usurp judicial power and
7. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I thought we had
adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of a. . .statute: first, find the ordinary
meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using established canons of construction,
ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one
applies.").
8. See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 65-66 (2002) (stating the author's
view that a purposivist approach is best).
9. See infra notes 14-53 and accompanying text.
10.
See, e.g., Pub. L. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)) (stating that "[no statements other than [a specific interpretive
memorandum] shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative
history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act...."); Organized Crime Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942, 947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000))
(directing judges not to apply the rule of lenity to the Act's provisions).
11.
See infra notes 54-97 and accompanying text.
12.
See infra notes 102-295 and accompanying text.
13.
See infra notes 296-386 and accompanying text.
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control the interpretive process. Interpretive directives present the most
challenging analysis: In sum, interpretive directives are likely unconstitutional when enacted to apply generally to many statutes, but not when
enacted to apply specifically to just one. It may be an odd, formalistic distinction, but it is one that I believe helps to identify the point at which Congress
shifts from partner to master in the interpretive dialogue.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Two state cases from Connecticut and Delaware illustrate the increasingly
active role legislatures are taking in response to judicial decisionmaking. First, in
2003, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided State v. Courchesne." The facts of
the case are simple. Late one December evening, Robert Courchesne stabbed
Demetris Rodgers to death over his $410 drug debt." Courchesne lured Rodgers
to a bank under the guise of getting cash to pay her. 6 Instead, he stabbed her
and left her bloody body in the street." At the time of her death, Rodgers was
pregnant." Although she died before arriving at the hospital, the physicians
performed an emergency cesarean section and delivered her baby, who lived for
forty-two days before dying from deprivation of oxygen to the brain."
Courchesne was convicted of "murder[ing] two or more persons at the
same time or in the course of a single transaction."20 A state statute permitted the imposition of the death penalty when "the defendant committed the
offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.. . ."2 The narrow
issue for the court was whether the statute required the state to prove that the
defendant killed in an especially cruel manner both victims, the mother and
the baby, or just one victim, the mother." In other words, the issue was
whether "the offense" meant the killing of just the mother or of both the
mother and her baby. The majority held that the offense referred to the killing

14.

816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003).

15.

Id. at 567.

See also Courant.com, Connecticut's Death Row Inmates, http:/

www.courant.com/news/hc-deathrow-pg,0,3123710photogalleryindex=hc-courchense-deathrow
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
16.
Drug-Rehabs.org, Connecticut Man Sentenced to Death for Killing Pregnant Woman,
http://www.drug-rehabs.org/con.php?cid=1 194&state=Connecticut (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
Id.
17.
18.
Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 567.
19.
Id. at 568.
20.
Id. at 568 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West 2003)).
21.
Id.at 569 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i)(4) (West 2003)).
22.
See id.
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of one victim, not both; thus, Courchesne was eligible for the death penalty
even though only one death was determined to be especially cruel."
Given the heinous nature of the crime, the holding might not seem
particularly surprising. Yet in reaching this holding, the majority acknowledged that the plain meaning of the statute supported the defendant's
argument that he was not subject to the death penalty." Nonetheless, the
majority concluded that the context and history of the statute suggested that
the state legislature had not intended the statute to apply as the plain meaning would suggest.25 The majority reasoned that the statute's purpose was to
deter crime, which would be best furthered by interpreting the statute to apply
to Courchesne's circumstances. Hence, the majority rejected the plain
meaning of the statute and interpreted the statute in light of its purpose.26
The majority then went one step further and used the case as an opportunity
to explicitly reject the plain meaning rule for all statutory interpretation cases
in the state.27 In its place, the majority formally adopted purposivism, an
approach that focuses on the purpose of the statute.
A spirited dissent disagreed not only with the result, but with the
majority's adoption of purposivism.29 The dissent criticized the majority for
substituting its view of what the law should be for unambiguous statutory text. 30
The dissent persuasively argued that because the language of the statute was
ambiguous, the rule of lenity required the court to adopt the least penal interpretation: that the state must prove that both murders were committed in an
especially cruel manner." More relevantly for our purposes, the dissent described
the majority's opinion as "nothing short of breathtaking."3 2 "[Tihe majority's
abandonment of the plain meaning rule in favor of an alternative and novel
method of statutory interpretation represents an incorrect deviation from our
traditional mode of statutory interpretation and an impermissible usurpationof
the legislativefunction.""
23.

Id. at 569-70.

24.

Id. at 569.

25.
Id. at 569-70.
26.
See id. at 576.
27.
See id. at 578.
Id.
28.
29.
Id. at 597-98 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
30.
See id. at 613.
31.
Id. at 604-06. The majority never responded to the dissent's rule of lenity argument. Id.
32.
Id. at 597.
33.
Id. (emphasis added). The plain meaning rule and textualism are used relatively interchangeably in judicial opinions because textualism relies so heavily on the plain meaning canon of
interpretation. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATLTFORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMs, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 95, n.* (2006).
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Apparently, the Connecticut legislature agreed. In direct response to the
holding in Courchesne, just three months later the state legislature rejected the
court's adoption of purposivism and enacted a statute directing the Connecticut
courts to use a plain meaning approach to interpretation. The statute provided:
The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained
from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the
meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of
the statute shall not be considered.
Without first considering whether it could constitutionally have a role in determining how judges should interpret statutes, the legislature simply took control.
What is surprising about this case is not the holding, not the reasoning, not
the adoption of purposivism, and not even the prompt legislative response.
Rather, it is the reaction-or lack of one--of the Connecticut courts to the
legislature's power-grabbing reply to Courchesne. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has not questioned the legislature's ability to enact a law that
potentially usurps the judiciary's interpretive function.
In contrast, the Delaware judiciary did not submit so meekly to the power
play of its legislature. The relevant case proceeded as follows. In an initial
opinion, Evans v. State," the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with a defendant who argued that his life sentence for first degree rape was illegal because
it did not provide a conditional release date." Accordingly, the court found
that the defendant's life sentence ended after a term of forty-five years, rather
than at the end of his natural life."
After rendering that decision, however, the court decided to reconsider
the holding." Because of the pending reconsideration, the first opinion never
became final." Nevertheless, the Delaware General Assembly took issue with

34.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2003). Justice Borden, the author of the concurring opinion in Courchesne, points out:
It is ironic that the legislative debate surrounding [this statute] specifically indicated that its
purpose was to overrule that part of Courchesne. If we were to read [this statute] literally,
and assume that it is not ambiguous in any way, we would be barred by it from consulting
that very legislative history in order to determine that its purpose was to overrule Courchesne.
Carmel Hollow Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Bethlehem, 848 A.2d 451, 470 n.1 (Conn. 2004) (Borden, J.,
concurring).
35.
No. 67, 2004, 2004 Del. LEXIS 545 (Nov. 23, 2004), withdrawn, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005).
36.
Id. at *6.
37.
See id. at *5.
38.
Evans, 872 A.2d at 543.
39.
Id.at 541-42.
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the opinion, and, during the pendency, enacted House Bill number 31.40
That bill declared the court's initial opinion in Evans "null and void" and
asserted the legislature's right to determine the meaning of its laws.'
More importantly for this Article, the bill included language telling
Delaware's judiciary (1) to "strictly interpret or construe legislative intent," (2) to
"use the utmost restraint when interpreting or construing the laws of [Delaware],"
and (3) to not "interpret or construe statutes . .. when the text [is] clear and
unambiguous." 4 2 The Delaware statute differed from the Connecticut statute,
which created a rule applicable to all cases. The Delaware statute, in
part, purported to tell the Delaware courts how to decide a particular
case. Federal statutes that provide a rule of decision violate federal separation
of powers. Legislatures cannot review judicial decisions or decide particular
cases. But the Delaware statute also created a rule for future cases: The
Delaware courts were ordered to strictly construe legislative intent and the
laws of Delaware. It is this latter portion of the statute that is relevant here.
Unlike Connecticut's judiciary, the Delaware Supreme Court promptly
rejected the legislature's attempt to "assert[ ] its right and prerogative to be
the ultimate arbiter of the intent, meaning, and construction of its laws"" and
declared the bill unconstitutional. In reaching the holding that the directive violated separation of powers, the court extensively reviewed the federal
separation of powers doctrine and found the Delaware doctrine to be identical." According to the court, the statute "attempt[ed] to confer upon the
General Assembly fundamental judicial powers" and therefore violated
Delaware's separation of powers.

Id.
40.
41.
Id.at 543 (citing H.B. 31, 143rd. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005)). The fill statute provided:
§ 5403. Construction and interpretation of laws.
(a) Delaware judicial officers may not create or amend statutes, nor second-guess the
soundness of public policy or wisdom of the General Assembly in passing
statutes, nor may they interpret or construe statutes and other Delaware law
when the text is clear and unambiguous.
(b) Notwithstanding 11 Del. C. § 203, Delaware judicial officers shall strictly interpret or construe legislative intent.
(c) Delaware judicial officers shall use the utmost restraint when interpreting or
construing the laws of this State.
H.B. 31. (held unconstitutional by Evans, 872 A.2d at 549).
Id.
42.
43.
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871).
H.B. 31.
44.
45.
Evans, 872 A.2d at 550.
46.
Id. at 545-50.
47.
Id.at 550.
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The Connecticut and Delaware legislatures are not the only state legislatures to attempt to rein in their judiciaries with statutory directives. Many
other states have enacted similar directives." Despite the possible separation
of powers conflict, 9 I am not aware of any state's judiciary other than Delaware's
that has squarely examined its legislature's ability to take this power.
Congress has also begun its foray into this arena. While Congress has
not enacted a general theoretical directive like Connecticut's, Congress has
enacted specific theoretical and interpretive directives."o And with the
For a relatively complete listing, see infra note 83.
48.
49.
Federalism principles prevent the federal government from imposing federal separation of
powers notions on states, which can choose to structure themselves however they like. See, e.g., Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state
among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself."); Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) ("Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a state shall
be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one
department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another
department of government, is for the determination of the state."); cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (stating in dictum that "the concept of separation of powers embodied in the
United States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments"). The U.S. Constitution does, however, presuppose that each state will have judicial, executive, and legislative branches. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed. 2000).
For example, the "work made for hire" definition in the U.S. Copyright Act is followed by
50.
a theoretical directive:
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under
paragraph (2), neither [a later enacted] amendment ... nor the deletion of the words added
by that amendment(A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or
(B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or
acquiescence in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if [later amendments] .. . were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the
Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
According to Professor David Post, this provision was added after Congress amended the
definition in 1999 to include sound recordings then immediately deleted the amendment in 2000 in
response to industry concern. According to Professor Post, this provision says to courts, "When
interpreting the work made for hire provisions, you must not take into account certain facts about the
world, namely the fact that in 1999 we amended the statute, and that in 2000 we deleted the amendment."
Posting of David Post to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1223579568.shtml#456941 (Oct. 9,
2008, 15:12 PST). As Professor Post suggests, this provision encroaches "on a core judicial function---the
function of statutory interpretation; not just telling courts what Congress thinks a statute means
(which Congress does all the time, via statutory definitions and the like), but telling courts what
tools of statutory construction they may or may not use when interpreting the statute." Id.; see also
Organized Crime Control Act Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942, 947 (1970) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (2000)) (directing judges to liberally construe its provisions); Pub. L. 102-166, §
105(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)) ("No statements
other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at [137 CONG. REC. S28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth),] shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any
way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards
Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.").
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increasing tension between the judiciary and Congress over activism, it is
likely that Congress will increase its use of directives in the future. "Congress
has both the power to regulate statutory interpretation and the incentives to
do so... 5."" Indeed, some legal scholars, like Nicholas Rosenkranz and Stephen
Ross, have urged Congress to do so." But they are misguided; this issue is one
for the judiciary to resolve, not the legislature."
II.

STATUTORY DIRECTIVEs DEFINED

Statutory directives are statutes that tell the judiciary how to interpret a
statute or statutes. There are many different types of directives. For this
Article, I categorize statutory directives in three ways. First, directives can be
characterized as definitional, interpretive, or theoretical depending on
whether the legislative goal in enacting the directive is to define a term
(definitional), to affect the outcome of interpretation (interpretive), or to
influence the interpretive process itself (theoretical). Second, statutory directives
are either specific, applying to just one statute, or general, applying to more
than one statute. Finally, statutory directives are either mandatory, meaning
judges must follow the directive, or presumptive, meaning judges may follow
the directive. These distinctions are explained more fully below because, in
this context, categorization matters.
A.

Definitional Directives

Definitional directives are the most familiar and common type of directives. These directives are statutes that define terms for either one or many
statutes. For example, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) provides: "In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress ... the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
51.
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction
and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743, 768 (1992).
52.
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 2085, 2088 (2002); contra Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing
Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CoNsT. COMMENT. 97, 98 (2003)
(rejecting Professor Rosenkranz's proposal and arguing that neither the courts nor Congress can limit
the interpretation of statutes through rules of interpretation without violating entrenchment
principles-the notion that an earlier legislature cannot bind a later legislature). Stephen F. Ross,
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turm Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 561, 566-72 (1992) (suggesting that Congress adopt interpretive rules by statute).
53.
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027,
2108-12 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Response, On Learning From Others, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1309, 1310-12 (2007).
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wife... ."" DOMA is a general definitional directive because its definition
of the word "marriage" applies to most federal statutes. Legislatures more
commonly define a word for a particular statute. Illustratively, in the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)," Congress
defined "enterprise" as including "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 6 Regardless of whether a
directive defines a term generally for all statutes, such as DOMA, or specifically for just one statute, such as RICO, it is a definitional directive.
B.

Interpretive Directives

Interpretive directives are more diverse. These directives tell judges how
to interpret either all statutes or a particular statute.57 There are many different
types of interpretive directives. For example, some interpretive directives tell
judges to construe statutes broadly or narrowly." Other interpretive directives
tell judges to ignore the rule of lenity." And still other interpretive directives urge courts to prefer the ordinary to the technical meaning of words in
a statute. 60 The Delaware statute identified earlier in Part 1161 was an interpretive directive.
C.

Theoretical Directives

Theoretical directives tell judges what process to use to interpret
statutes. A number of approaches to, or "theories of," interpretation have
54.
55.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (2006).

56.
Id.
57.
Like definitional directives, interpretive directives also may be either specific or general.
58.
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.080(1) (West 2008) ("All statutes of this state shall be
liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature, and
the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply to the
statutes of this state.").
59.
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1999) ("The rule of the common law, that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be construed according
to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.").
60.
E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.080(4) (West 2008) ("All words and phrases shall be
construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases,
and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed
according to such meaning.").
61.
See supra note 41. The statute enacted by the Delaware legislature directed its judiciary to
"strictly interpret or construe legislative intent," (2) to "use the utmost restraint when interpreting or
construing the laws of [Delaware]," and (3) to not "interpret or construe statutes ... when the text [is]
clear and unambiguous." H.B. 31, 143rd. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005).
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been adopted by judges. There are three dominant theories: textualism (or
plain meaning), purposivism, and intentionalism.62 To oversimplify, textualists focus on the words of the text, believing that judges will best further the
legislative agenda by giving words their ordinary meaning. Purposivists
focus on the broad, at times unexpressed, purpose of the bill, believing that
judges will further the legislative agenda best by furthering a particular bill's
purpose. 4 Intentionalists focus on the legislative process and legislative history,
believing that judges will best further the legislative agenda by comparing various
versions of the bill and the legislators' statements accompanying those versions.
A significant distinction between the supporters of each theory is their
willingness to consider and give weight to sources other than statutory text.
There are three sources of meaning: (1) intrinsic (or textual), (2) extrinsic, and
(3) policy-based." Intrinsic sources include materials that are part of the official
text being interpreted, the most important being the words of the statute
itself.67 Other intrinsic sources include grammar and punctuation; components
such as purpose and findings clauses, titles, and definition sections; other
statutes in existence when the statute at issue was enacted; statutes subsequently enacted; and the linguistic canons of statutory interpretation.
Extrinsic sources, while not part of the text of the specific statute, are
related to the enactment process, either specifically or generally." Extrinsic
sources include such things as the legislative history of the statute being interpreted,"o subsequent legislative acquiescence," borrowed statutes,72 and
interpretations by agencies."
62.
63.
64.
65.

JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 7.

Id.
Id.
Id.

66.
While it would be nice if these categories were consistently defined in judicial opinions
and academic circles, they are not. What one judge calls a policy-based source, another judge might
identify as an extrinsic source. Id. at 5. Knowing which category a source falls within is less important than understanding that there is a breadth of evidentiary sources available to judges and that
some judges are more willing to look beyond intrinsic sources for meaning. Id. at 5-6. See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law As
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L REv. 26, 97, 101 (1994).
John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation:An Outine of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333,
67.
338 (1976) (stating that the first steps in the interpretation process, as taught by Felix Frankfurter,
are always "(1) read the statute, (2) Read the Statute, (3) READ THE STATUTE!" (citing HENRY
J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967))).
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 5.
68.
Id. at 6. While the use of intrinsic sources is generally uncontroversial, the use of some
69.
forms of extrinsic sources, particularly legislative history, is condemned by some. See, e.g., Green v.

Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia,

J., concurring) (stating that his

reason for concurring was to make clear that legislative history was not relevant to interpretation).
The legislative history is the written record of a bill's enactment process.
70.
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Last are policy-based sources. These sources are separate from the statutory text and the legislative process. They reflect important social and legal
choices derived from federal and state constitutions and common law."
Examples of policy-based sources include the constitutional avoidance doctrine," the rule of lenity,76 clear statement rules,77 and the reciprocal rules that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed while
remedial statutes should be broadly construed." When policy-based sources
are codified, they become interpretive directives because they tell courts how
to construe one or more statutes.
Which of these sources a judge will consider depends, in large part, on
that judge's theory of statutory interpretation. Judges who focus on text
generally believe that the statute's words are central; thus, they focus primar71.
"Legislative acquiescence" refers to the canon that subsequent legislative silence shows acquiescence by the legislative branch to an interpretation previously given to a statute by the judiciary.
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 225.
72.
"Borrowed statutes" refers to the canon that when a state adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, the borrowing state's courts "will look to settled judicial construction in the other jurisdiction as
of the time the statute was adopted." Id. at 345.
73.
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Court held that deference is due to an agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. at 838. The exact
parameters of this deference are still being explored. Compare Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (suggesting that less deference is due when an agency acts using less formal
procedures), with Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (stating in dicta that Chevron
deference may be appropriate even when an agency uses less formal procedures).
74.
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 6.
75.
The constitutional avoidance doctrine directs that when there are two reasonable interpretations of statutory language, one of which raises constitutional issues and one of which does not, the
statute should be interpreted in a way that does not raise the constitutional issue. See AlmedarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
76.
Pursuant to the rule of lenity, judges should strictly interpret statutes that punish citizens
by imposing a fine or imprisonment. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60
(1987) (reversing the defendants' mail fraud convictions based on the rule of lenity).
77.
A statute is in derogation of common law when it partially repeals or abolishes existing
common law rights or otherwise limits the scope, utility, or force of that law. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 476 (8th ed. 2004); Shaw v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565
(1879) ("No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import.").
In contrast, a statute passed to repair the common law is not in derogation of the common law, but
rather is in aid of the common law. Hence, these "remedial" statutes, as they came to be known, are
to be liberally, not narrowly, construed to achieve the statutory purpose. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
78.
A clear statement of legislative intent is generally required
[wihere a statute can be interpreted to abridge long-held individual or states' rights or when
it appears that a legislature has made a large policy change. .. . The requirement of a clear,
or plain, statement is based on the simple assumption that a legislature would not make
major changes without being absolutely clear about doing so.
LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 244 (2008).

79.

See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 7-8.
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ily, but not necessarily exclusively, on intrinsic sources."o Judges who
look for legislative intent focus on both intrinsic and extrinsic sources,
often perusing the legislative history, to find the specific intent of the
enacting body. Because purposivists generally believe that the purpose of the statute is as important as the text, judges who focus on purpose
are willing to look globally at all sources to find purpose.
The point of this Article is not to argue that a particular approach
best determines meaning; those arguments have already been made."
Rather, the purpose of this Article is to determine who should control
this choice: the legislature or the judiciary.
Some legislatures try to control this choice with theoretical
directives, which tell judges what sources of meaning, or "evidence," 82 they
may consider when interpreting a statute. Currently, quite a few state
legislatures have enacted theoretical directives; some state legislatures have
chosen to stress the text, while others have not." For example, the Iowa
legislature enacted a theoretical statute that provides as follows:
80.
See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997), for a detailed description of this theory. Interestingly, legislators seem less convinced
that textualism is the proper approach. See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking
Congress' Will, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 913, 918 (March 24, 1990)); Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 750
(citing Joan Biskupic, Congress Keeps Eye on ]ustices as Court Watches Hill's Words, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2863 (Oct. 5, 1991)); accord Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and Separation
of Powers, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGiS. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 35 (1998) ("Even though Congress has never formally
voted to require that legislative history, or particular aspects of legislative history, be considered in
interpreting statutes, it seems reasonably clear that, over a long period of time, a large majority of
Congress has rejected the absolutist position that legislative history should never be used to interpret
an ambiguous statute.").
81.
See, e.g., Carlos E. Gonzalez, Statutory Interpretation: Looking Back. Looking Forward., 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 703 (2006) (exploring some of the arguments surrounding statutory interpretation); see
also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 890913 (2003) (cataloging the influential work on interpretation).
By using the term evidence, I do not mean it in the traditional legal sense. Rather, I mean it
82.
to refer to the sources of evidence a court will consider in construing statutory language. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.
83.
In addition to Connecticut and Iowa, other states that have statutory directives include
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-203 (West 2008); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-1(a) (West
2008) ("In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General
Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy."); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1-15 (LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92 cmt. a (McKinney 2008) ("The primary
consideration of the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature."); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (2008); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1.49 (West 2008); Pennsylvania, 2003 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1939 (West 2008) ("The comments
or report of the commission, committee, association or other entity which drafted a statute may be
consulted in the construction or application of the original provisions of the statute... but the text of
the statute shall control in the event of conflict between its text and such comments or report."); and
Texas, TEx. GovT CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005) (providing that, in construing even an
unambiguous statute, a court may consider inter alia the purpose of the statute, the circumstances under
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Ifa statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislature, may consider among other matters:
(1) The object sought to be attained.
(2) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
(3) The legislative history.
(4) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws
upon the same or similar subjects.
(5) The consequences of a particular construction.
(6) The administrative construction of the statute.
(7) The preamble or statement of policy.84

While Congress has not yet enacted a general theoretical directive, ' it
has enacted at least one specific theoretical directive.' To date, the question
of whether this specific directive violates separation of powers has not been
addressed, although some have noted the quandary it leaves for the courts."
Because this directive has not been challenged, Congress may be encouraged
to enact additional theoretical directives.'"
D.

Mandatory and Presumptive Directives

Statutory directives can also be distinguished on the basis of whether the
directive is mandatory, presumptive, or permissive. Mandatory directives give
courts little option: If a definitional directive defines "white" as "black," then
white means black. Or, to take an actual case, a statute may define "building"

which the statute was enacted, legislative history, common law or former statutory provisions,
administrative interpretations, and preambles).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.6 (West 2008).
84.
85.
Specific theoretical directives are less common than general. Because the legislature is
generally trying to influence the court's approach in all cases, theoretical directives are commonly
general directives. But see, e.g., Pub. L. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
86.
Id. ("No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at 1137 CONG.
REC. S28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth),] shall be considered legislative
history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this
Act that relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.").
87.
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 963 (2005) ("That Interpretive Memorandum states laconically that '[t]he
terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Gris v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove PackingCo. v. Atonio.' Because the Court's pre-Wards Cove decisions send conflicting signals, this
statement offers little guidance, leaving the scope of the defendant's burden open to question." (citations
omitted) (quoting 137 CONG. REC. S28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth))).
88.
See Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 768 ("Given that Congress has both the power to regulate
statutory interpretation and the incentives to do so, I regard canonical construction as an appropriate
means by which courts can preserve an important role in the process of creating law against potential
encroachments and disruptions by the legislature and the executive.").
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to include bulldozers. For the purposes of the statute, then, a bulldozer would
be a building despite the plain meaning of the word."
Other directives are merely presumptive, not mandatory. For example,
the Dictionary Act specifically provides that its definitions apply to all acts of
Congress "unless the context indicates otherwise.. . ." Presumptive directives
give judges wiggle room to avoid a directive that makes no sense in a specific
situation. For example, in United States v. Ekanem," the Second Circuit held
that the Dictionary Act did not control the meaning of the word "victim" in
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996,92 because the context of the
statute "indicate[d] otherwise.""
Sometimes, a directive appears mandatory, but courts interpret it as
presumptive. Consider, for example, an interpretive directive in RICO that
directs judges not to interpret that Act's provisions using the rule of lenity."
This directive raises constitutional concerns because the rule of lenity is
grounded in the Constitution's due process requirements." To avoid the
constitutional question that would be presented if courts ignored due process
concerns, some federal courts have interpreted the directive to apply only to
the civil provisions in RICO." Thus, even when a directive appears manda*97
tory, courts may interpret it as presumptive.
Intuitively, these categories of directives should seem different. Some of
the directives identified above probably appear benign, even appropriate,
such as definitional directives and directives that indicate a legislature's
preference that statutes be broadly or narrowly construed. Other directives
seem ill-considered, or even invading, such as directives that tell the judiciary
89.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.030(1), 513.010 (West 2007).
90.
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
91.
383 F.3d 40, 41 (2d Cit. 2004) (holding that "the Government fits within the meaning of
'victim' under the [Mandatory Victims Restitution Act]").
92.
Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 122.
93.
383 F.3d 40, 42-43 (2d Cit. 2004) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1). Context, in this case, includes
an enforcement provision that provides: "In any case in which the United States is a victim, the
court shall ensure that all other victims receive full restitution before the United States receives any
restitution." Id. at 43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i) (2006)). This provision made clear that
"victim" included the United States. Id.
94.
Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942, 947 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006)).
95.
"The applicability of the liberal construction standard has been questioned in criminal
RICO cases in view of the general canon of interpretation that ambiguities in criminal statutes are
to be construed in favor of leniency." Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1128 n.3
(3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), overruled in part by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179,
187-90 (1997).
96.
Keystone Ins. Co., 863 F.2d at 1128 ("At a minimum the liberal construction language
requires that we resist the temptation to restrict civil RICO.").
97.
Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 749.
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what sources of meaning to consider. And still others seem unconstitutional,
such as directives that tell a court to ignore the rule of lenity in a criminal
case. Is there a difference under separation of powers analysis? This Article
concludes that there is a difference. Some directives represent legitimate
legislative involvement in the interpretation dialogue, while others are unconstitutional attempts to usurp judicial power. The next two sections of this
Article explain the Court's jurisprudence in this area.
1Il.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Simply stated, separation of powers refers to the allocation of power and
function among the branches of the government.98 It concerns "the distribution of powers among the three coequal Branches; it does not speak to the
manner in which authority is parceled out within a single Branch.",
Separation of powers analysis examines the roles the legislature, the judiciary,
and the executive should respectively have in creating, interpreting, and
implementing law." Ultimately, this analysis involves categorizing governmental power, allocating authority for that power to one of three institutions, and identifying which personnel should exercise that power in a way
that best protects individual liberties and prevents tyranny.1o1
Legal scholars have divided the Supreme Court's separation of powers
doctrine into two approaches. 2 The formalist approach emphasizes the need
to maintain three distinct branches of government based on function.' 3 The
98.
M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127,
1132 (2000).
99.
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1991) (holding that Congress could
delegate to the Attorney General rather than another member of the executive branch, the power to
identify illegal substances (citation omitted)).
100.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 767.
101.
See generally Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991) (discussing the theory of separation of powers and arguing that the Framers designed it
to protect individual liberties).
102.
See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The ContemporaryDebate About Legislative-Executive Separation
of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-35 (1987). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. C . REV. 225, 229-35; Peter R. Strauss,
Fonnal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987); Timothy T. Hui, Note, A "Tier-ful" Revelation: A Principled
Approach to Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1403, 1428-30 (1993) (discussing the
aggrandizement problem); Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separationof Powers and the Supreme
Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 961 (1995) (explaining the various visions and the
justices adhering to each approach). But see Harold J.Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1988) (arguing "that the current debate between a
formalist and functionalist approach is to a large measure misconceived").
103.
See discussion infra Part Ill.B.1.
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functionalist approach emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic flexibility
These categories and the Court's
to respond to modem government.'
jurisprudence in this area are imperfect. Indeed, various scholars have criticized
the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence as "abysmal,"'05 "utterly
asinine,"o' and "appalling."' It is a doctrine easily invoked, but not clearly
explained.'" At its essence, separation of powers is a doctrine that has been
compartmentalized into two categories, but has never been completely
cabined within either.
In this Part, I describe separation of powers and these two prevailing
approaches. In doing so, I describe the current doctrine as explained by the
Supreme Court. I do not evaluate the consistency of the Court's jurisprudence in this area, for that is not my purpose. Rather, my purpose is to predict
the Court's resolution of this issue. Despite the criticism and numerous
suggestions for reform,'" the Court's jurisprudence shows that both doctrines
are alive and well today. Because I cannot anticipate which approach the
Court would use to resolve the constitutionality of statutory directives, I
analyze this issue using both.

104.
See Barak, supra note 8, at 120; see also discussion infra Part III.B.2. The formalistfunctionalist division is not without criticism. E.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches
in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 604 (2001) (arguing that the formalist-

functionalist distinction is of little use).
105.
Elliott, supra note 5, at 507.
106.
Id.
Aaron-Andrews P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separationof
107.
Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 384 (2003).
108.
Magill, supra note 98, at 1132-33 (describing the formalist and functionalist approaches
to separation of powers).
109.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 101, at 1515-16 (suggesting that "[t]he protection of individual
rights ... should provide ... an animating principle for the jurisprudence of separated powers"); Harold
H. Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (1979) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court should consider "whether the other branches can effectively exercise their checks");
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 682-84 (1997)
(suggesting that separation of powers should focus on the political constituencies of the different
branches of government and the sequence of their decisionmaking); Krent, supra note 102, at 1256-57
(arguing that the Constitution already limits each branch of the federal government); Magill, supranote
98, at 1146-47 (describing "abstention" and other approaches); Merrill, supra note 102, at 228 (suggesting
that every federal office be located in one of the three branches and be subject to the limitations of that
branch); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 757-60 (1999)
(describing various approaches); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govem": The
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991) (promoting
"pragmatic formalism" and criticizing other alternatives); Paul R. Verkuil, Separationof Powers, the Rule
of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 303-22 (1989) (suggesting that
courts should focus on preventing conflicts of interest between the three branches).
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Historical Development of Separation of Powers Doctrine

To understand the separation of powers doctrine of today, we must start
with the past. The Framers believed that lawful power was derived from the
people and must be held in check to preserve individual liberty."o Protection
of individual liberty required both the separation of the federal and state
governments, known as federalism, and the separation of the branches of the
federal government, known as separation of powers.
Although the Framers were concerned with separation of powers, they
did not include a specific "Separation of Powers Clause" in the Constitution. 2
This omission was deliberate. Many of the colonies had such clauses in their

early constitutions."' Most of these provisions separated the judiciary from the
other two branches. But Massachusetts's provision was unique. That state had
"the most famous constitutional statement of the separation of powers doctrine."1. The Massachusetts Constitution, which was adopted in 1780 before
the federal Constitution, specifically provides that none of Massachusetts's three
branches of government shall ever exercise the power of any of the other
branches."' The federal Constitution does not contain similar language, even
though James Madison specifically proposed such language in one draft of the
Bill of Rights."' It is not clear why his language was rejected."' In any event,

supra note 49, at 6-7.
Id.
at 7.
Elliott, supra note 5, at 508.
For a description of the separation of powers approaches by the various state governments, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 275-78 (James Madison) (EH. Scott ed., 1898). Virginia was the first state to
include a separation of powers clause in its constitution. Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The
Supreme Court's Separation of Pouers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L REv. 587, 588 (1990) (explaining
that Virginia separated "the Legislative and Executive powers of the State... from the Judicative").
114.
Id. at 588.
115.
MAsS. CONST., pt. 1, art. XXX ("In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.").
116.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at 128 n.16 (citing 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1151 (1971)). James Madison's proposed language was similar to
Massachusetts's provision:
The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to which they
are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers
vested in the executive or judicial, nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the
legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or
executive departments.
1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 453 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
117.
At least one representative suggested that such an amendment would be duplicative
"inasmuch as the constitution assigned the business of each branch of the Government to a separate
110.

111.
112.
113.

TRIBE,
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history shows that complete separation of powers, such as that suggested by
Massachusetts's provision,"' was specifically rejected."'
Had the Massachusetts-like provision been adopted, the federal government would look much different than it does. For example, "the rise of the
modern administrative agency would have been impossible." 20 By allowing
the creation of agencies, the Court recognized "that modern government [had
to] address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues."' 2 ' A rigid approach to
separation of powers was simply unworkable in modern times. Hence, Congress
could delegate its lawmaking powers (and the judiciary's judicial powers) to the
executive, so long as Congress provided an "intelligible principle."'22
The Framers' desire to strengthen individual freedom required more than
just separation of powers; the concentration of power in the hands of any one
branch of government likewise had to be prevented.' Individual liberty was
endangered "where the whole power of one department [was] exercised by the
same hands which possess[ed] the whole power of another department.""z' No
branch should dominate the others, lest tyranny result.'25 Tyranny was not
department." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 789 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Schwartz, supra note 113, at 590.
Another representative suggested such a clause would be subversive of the Constitution. Id. at 590.
118.
Whether Massachusetts' separation of powers is, in reality, as complete as it is articulated
is questionable. In a part of its Constitution entitled "The Frame of Government," governmental
powers are intermingled. For example, the Massachusetts's legislature is authorized to appoint all
civil officers, a power typically reserved to the executive branch. See TRIBE, supra note 49, at 128
n.16 (citing Brian S. Koukoutchos, Constitutional Kinetics: The Independent Counsel Case and the
Separation of Powers, 23 WAKE FOREST L.REV. 635, 649-50, 650 n.92 (1988)).
As Professor Schwartz notes:
119.
Whatever separation of powers may be provided for, it does not compel a bright line
separation between the departments, with each of them expressly prohibited from exercising any power appropriate to one of the others. That would have been the case under the
Madison-proposed separation of powers amendment modeled as it was after the
Massachusetts provision. Its rejection indicates a more flexible approach to the separation
of powers.
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 590.
120.
Id. at 592. Agencies can promulgate rules and regulations that have the force of law, can
investigate and prosecute entities that violate the law, and can adjudicate cases and render decisions
that have binding effect. In other words, administrative agencies have legislative, judicial, and
executive powers all wrapped into one package. Id. at 592-93 (stating that administrative agencies
have legislative and judicial functions).
121.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
122.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). As Professor Schwartz notes, the pre-Burger
Court had "relegated the requirement of a defined standard to the level of a purely formal one,
devoid of most of its practical efficacy." Schwartz, supra note 113, at 596. Essentially, Congress
could delegate, requiring only that the executive act in "the public interest." NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
123.
See Barak, supra note 8, at 120.
124.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-36 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
125.
See TRIBE, supra note 49, at 7.
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understood simply as the misuse or exercise of power; "[r]ather, it [was] the
very fact of its accumulation that Madison equated with tyranny.", 26
To prevent tyranny, the Framers included provisions requiring at least
two of the branches to cooperate to affect individual rights; for example,
"[plassage of a federal law . . . requires the concurrence of both Houses of
Congress and the agreement of the Executive ... ; enforcement of the law in turn
often requires cooperation of the Judiciary and the Executive but no further
action by Congress."1 27 Bicameral passage, the requirement that both houses
of Congress approve legislation in identical form, reduces legislative predominance.128 The presidential veto gives the executive power over the legislature
to veto acts of Congress.129 The Senate must ratify treaties and has the
power to oversee the selection of some executive and judicial officers.' Both
of these powers check the power of the president. Judicial independence
from both the executive and the legislature is preserved with lifetime tenure
and pay security."' Nonetheless, Congress defines the jurisdiction of all
inferior courts. 32 And Congress, via the impeachment power, also has the
ability to address corruption and abuse of power by anyone in either the executive or judicial branches.' The Framers specifically included these checks
and balances to limit the possibility that one branch would tyrannize the
other two. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."'
By including passages such as the appointments, salary, and tenure
clauses, the Framers hoped to prevent "beholdenness,""' or dependency, of
126.
Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 464.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at 122.
127.
128.
U.S. CONsr. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl. 2.
Id. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
129.
130.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
131.
Id. art. II, § 1.
132.
Id. art. Ill, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
133.
134.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
135.
The Court recognized the Framers' concern with beholdenness in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926). In that case, the Court examined the appointments clause and struck down a
statute that required the president to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate prior to removing
the postmaster general. Id. at 106-18, 176. According to the Court, the power to remove a federal
officer necessarily accompanied the constitutionally granted power to appoint that officer. Id. at 122,
126-27, 164. It did not flow from the constitutionally granted power to advise on and consent to
that appointment. Id. In reaching this holding, the Court was concerned that if executive
appointees were beholden to the legislature for their livelihood they would cease to be an
independent department of the government. Id. at 131.
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any one of the branches."' In Madison's view, separation of powers would be
compromised if one branch were beholden to another for reappointment or
reelection."' These clauses helped to insure the separateness and independence of the branches."' "The discourse of inter-branch beholdenness was the
Framers' chief idiom for conceptualizing the separation of powers."
Legislative intrusions into the judicial sphere are particularly troubling
for the purposes of our discussion because the Framers most feared legislative
usurpation of judicial power.'" The Framers had this concern because prior
to the drafting of the Constitution, they lived under the British system in
which legislative and judicial powers were regularly intermingled."' Moreover,
in early America, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonial legislatures
routinely acted as courts of last resort and enacted special bills to overturn
specific judicial decisions. 2 Because of the lack of judicial independence in
both the British and early colonial systems, most of the early state constitutions contained separation of powers clauses. "Although the specific
provisions varied, the legal result .. . was the same: to define the sovereign
power with precision and to restrain its exercise within marked boundaries.""'
During the ratification of the federal Constitution in 1787, the primary
collective concern of the states was the lack of a separation of powers clause
limiting legislative intrusions into the judicial sphere."' In response to this
concern, Federalist Paper Number 81"' made clear that the draft was "modeled after many existing state constitutions.""' It specifically explained that
the proposed constitution would prevent Congress from interfering with a
particular case: "'A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse

136.
Bruhl, supra note 107, at 383.
137.
Id.at 407 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1781, at 34 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) (1787)).
Id.
138.
139.

Id. at 407 (citing Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation"for the Separation of Powers:

The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 459-63 (1996)).
140.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at 146.
Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 544-45 (Del. 2005).
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
144.
Id. at 546.
145.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 544-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.Cooke ed., 1961).
Evans, 872 A.2d at 546 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 544-45 (Alexander
146.
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (identifying the constitutions of Delaware, Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Virginia as models); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 269 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898)).
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a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases."'
The Court's early jurisprudence understood separation of powers to be
categorical, stating that each branch must "be limited to the exercise of the
powers appropriate to its own department and no other.""' This rigid view
soon gave way, for it proved too extreme; the Constitution expressly
anticipates some comingling of functions."'9 By the end of the twentieth
century, the Court recognized this constitutionally induced power sharing
and backed away from its earlier view, acknowledging that "separation of
powers .. . did not make each branch . .. autonomous . . .. [Instead, it] left
each .. . dependent upon the others, as it left to each . .. power to exercise
functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial."o
B.

Two Competing Approaches: Formalism and Functionalism

Perhaps because the Constitution is less clear than it could be in this
area, the Court has not agreed on any one analysis for separation of powers
issues."' Rather, there are various ways that separation of powers may be
violated, and "there is no single test to detect them all."'52 Legal scholars
have divided the Court's separation of powers doctrine into two categories:
the formalist approach and the functionalist approach."' Simply put, the
formalist approach emphasizes the necessity of maintaining three distinct
branches of government based on function: one to legislate, one to execute,
and one to adjudicate. Overlap is permitted only when constitutionally
prescribed. The functionalist approach likewise recognizes that each of the
three branches has a core function and that it is most critical to maintain
separateness around these core functions. Unlike the formalist approach,
147.
Evans, 872 A.2d at 546 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E.Cooke, ed. 1961)).
148.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880); accord Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).
For example, the president has limited legislative power in approving or vetoing legisla149.
tion. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 7, cl. 2. The judiciary has limited legislative power in making common
law. See id. art. III, § 2. And the legislature has limited executive and judicial power in indicting and
adjudicating those accused of impeachable offences. Id. art. I, §§ 2-3.
150.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); accord United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("In designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended
to operate with absolute independence.").
151.
See Bruhl, supra note 107, at 406 n.224.
152.
Id.
153.
See sources cited supra note 102.
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however, the functionalist approach posits that overlap beyond the core
functions is practically necessary and even desirable.' Each approach is
described in more detail below.
1.

Formalist Principles

The formalist approach to separation of powers focuses on the functions
and the constraints found within the text of the Constitution. Formalists
divide the branches of government based on the function granted to each by
the vesting clauses.' The vesting clauses identify three categories of power
and, with some explicit exceptions, assign specific powers to each branch of
government.' Specifically, Article I grants Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted;"'" Article II grants the president "executive Power;""' and
Article III grants the judiciary "judicial Power."" "It is the intention of
the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the
government-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-shall be, in its
sphere, independent of the others."'" Formalism is, thus, a textually literal
approach that relies primarily on the vesting clauses to define categories of
power-legislative, executive, and judicial-and to identify the owner
of each power."' Under formalism,
the Court's role in separation of powers cases should be limited to
determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the
definition of that branch's constitutionally derived powers-executive,
legislative, or judicial. Ifthe answer is yes, the branch's action is constitutional; if the answer is no, the action is unconstitutional. 62

154.
The Court's separation of powers doctrine reflects a certain amount of eclecticism. For an
explanation of how to reconcile the Court's formal and functional approaches, see Tanielian, supra
note 102, at 999-1000 (arguing that when the "challenged action 'encroaches upon a power that the
text of the Constitution commits in explicit terms to [another branch],"' the Court applies a formalist
approach, but when "the power at issue [is] not explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution,"
the Court applies functionalism (quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 482,
484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
155.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
156.
Magill, supra note 104, at 608; see Bruhl, supra note 107, at 350.
157.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
158.
Id. art. II,§ 1, cl. 1.
159.
Id. art. Ill, § 1.
160.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871).
161.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The Constitution sought to divide the
delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial.").
162.
Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 454.
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Formalists are concerned with undue accretion of power, no matter how
small, and regardless of whether that power is being misused."' Accretion
of power in and of itself is unacceptable because once the power is built-up, it
can be difficult to determine whether too much power has been ceded; critically,
at this point, it would be too late to remedy the situation.'" Thus, formalists
view separation of powers doctrine as "prophylactic in nature[,] . . . designed
to avoid a situation in which one might even debate whether an undue
accretion of power has taken place.""'
Under formalism, separation of powers is violated when one branch
performs the "wrong" function."' So, for example, if the legislature performs
a function constitutionally entrusted to the judiciary or the executive,
separation of powers would be violated.'67 When confronting an issue that
raises separation of powers concerns, a formalist judge uses a rule-based
approach: first, identifying the power being exercised and then asking
whether the appropriate branch is exercising the power in the constitutionally prescribed way."' Thus, a formalist's first step is to categorize the relevant
activity as legislative, executive, or judicial in nature. But what exactly are
legislative, executive, and judicial acts?
a.

Legislative Acts

Legislative power, broadly defined, is the power "to promulgate generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits-to
achieve, maintain, or avoid particular social policy results."' It is the
power to create law and the procedural rules for enforcing those laws.'o
Legislative acts implement this power; they "[have] the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . .. outside
the Legislative Branch.""' Congress alters legal rights by legislating: enacting,
amending, and repealing laws.' 72 According to the Court's precedent, when
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.at 476.
Id.
Id.
Bruhl, supra note 107, at 350.
See id. at 404-05.
Magill, supra note 104, at 608-09.
Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 479.

170.
See William D. Araiza, The Trouble With Robertson: Equal Protection, The Separation of
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation,48 CATH. U. L. REV.

1055, 1079(1999).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto was
171.
"essentially legislative" in nature).
172.
Barak, supra note 8, at 133-34 ("The main role of the legislature isto enact statutes.").
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another branch (or only one house of Congress, for that matter) legislates, that
branch impermissibly performs a legislative act because democracy demands
that the legislature alter legal rights."'
For example, using formalism, the Court held the line-item veto unconstitutional in Clinton v. New York.'" The Line-Item Veto Act granted the president the power to veto certain provisions in appropriations bills.' The Court
held that the line-item veto violated separation of powers because the
president would be performing a legislative act, that of amending or repealing
legislation.' While the Court's reasoning in this case has been criticized,'"
the case remains good law.
Relatedly, the Court held the legislative veto unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha."' The legislative veto was, at one time, Congress's favored method of
controlling the 'Imperial Presidency,' resulting from [an] over-aggrandizement
of presidential power."" In an attempt to more closely control executive
power, Congress enacted legislative veto provisions in many statutes during
the 1970s. Legislative veto provisions provided a procedure whereby Congress
delegated authority to the executive, but reserved for itself-either to a single
chamber or to a committee from a single chamber-the power to oversee and

173.
See id. at 41.
174.
524 U.S. 417, 417 (1998). For a criticism of this case, see Steven G. Calabresi, Separation
of Power and the Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
77, 85 (2004) (arguing that the case actually raised a nondelegation issue "masquerading" as a
bicameral passage and presentment issue).
175.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1994 & Supp. 111996)). The Act
also disallowed the use of funds from any vetoed provisions to offset deficit spending in other areas.
Id. at 440-41 & n.31.
176.
Id. at 448-49. According to the Court, only Congress can legislate: "In both legal and
practical effect, the President [by way of the line item veto] has amended two Acts of Congress by
repealing a portion of each." Id. at 438.
177.
See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in
Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's Worth of Difference," 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337
(2000). For an interesting take on this issue, see H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying It on the
Line: A Dialogueon Line-Item Vetoes and Separationof Powers, 47 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1199-200 (1998).
178.
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(1), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has authority to suspend the deportation of certain aliens when the attorney general determined that "'deportation would ... result in
extreme hardship."' Id. at 924 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1970)). When the attorney general
makes such a finding, a report is sent to Congress. Id. at 924-25 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1)). Either
house has the power to veto the decision. Id. at 925 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)).
The plaintiff in Chadha successfully convinced the INS that returning to his homeland would lead
to extreme hardship. Id. at 924. Upon review, the House rejected the INS's decision. Id. at 926-27.
179.
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 598 (footnote omitted) (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESSINGER,
JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973)).
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veto the executive's use of this delegated authority." In essence, a part of
Congress acted as the executive's overseer.'"'
At the time Chadhawas decided, there were approximately two hundred
statutes with legislative vetoes.'82 Rather than decide the case narrowly and
reject only the specific legislative veto at issue, the Court categorically held that
all legislative vetoes violated separation of powers.'" The Court reasoned
that the House, by way of the legislative veto, was effectively, albeit unilaterally, amending legislation." Because amending legislation is a legislative
act, the constitutionally prescribed procedures for lawmaking had to be followed:
bicameral passage and presentment."' Because neither process was followed
under the Act, the Court held that the Act violated separation of powers.'
Note that in Chadha the majority held that the legislative veto violated
separation of powers not because the wrong branch was legislating, but rather
because the right branch was legislating in the wrong way. Under the Constitution, "lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the
President."' The legislative veto allowed Congress to make law without
following the bicameral passage and presentment process. Congress may not
"invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power"' and
"when it exercises its [own] legislative power, it must follow the 'single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures' specified in Article I.""
180.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1003-13 (app. to White, J., dissenting), for a list of the many
such statutes.
181.
This practice is similar to the British practice of laying administrative regulations before
Parliament, where either house could then annul them. Schwartz, supra note 113, at 597.
182.
Id. at 598 (citing Chadha,462 U.S. at 944-45).
183.
Justice O'Connor urged the other justices to decide the case more narrowly. Id. at 599
(citing Letter From Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren E.
Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 11, 1982)). Justice Powell would have preferred to
avoid the issue. Id. at 598-99 (citing Letter From Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1982)). The other justices
apparently believed that the time was ripe to resolve "'the persisting controversy between the
Executive and the Congress concerning the lawfulness of these one-house veto provisions."' Id. at
599 (quoting Letter From William J. Brennan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F.
Powell, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1982)). Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59.
184.
Id. at 947.
185.
See id. at 954-55, 958. Interestingly, Justice Powell argued that the act was judicial, not
legislative, because Congress essentially made individualized decisions that caused the deportation of
specific persons. Id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring). See Schwartz, supra note 113, at 599 (suggesting
that applying statutory language to a specific set of facts is adjudicatory in nature, not executive).
186.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59.
187.
Id. at 947.
188.
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (quoting J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
189.
Metro. Wash., 501 U.S. at 274 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (holding that a board of
review composed of members of Congress was unconstitutional)).
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Thus, legislative acts-enacting, amending, and repealing statutes-are
those acts that alter the rights, duties, or responsibilities of those outside the
legislature. When a branch other than Congress (or even when only a part of
Congress) legislates, that branch violates formalist separation of powers.
b.

Executive Acts

Just as legislating is the quintessential legislative act, executing the
laws is the quintessential executive act: applying a law already enacted by
Congress."'o "[T]he function of 'executing' the law ... inherently presupposes
a pre-existing 'law' to be executed. Thus, the executive branch is, in the
exercise of its 'executive' power, confined to the development of means to
enforce legislation already in existence." 91
Executive acts are those in which an official interprets an enacted law
and exercises judgment "concerning facts that affect the application of [that
law]."'"9 Indeed, the Court has stressed that "[t]he President's authority to act,
as with the exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.""9 " For this reason, the Court
held that President Harry S. Truman's executive order seizing the steel mills
was unconstitutional in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'" According to the Court, seizing private property altered private rights and was, thus,
legislative in nature.' Similarly in Medell(n v. Texas,9 the Court held
190.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1986).
191.
Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 480.
192.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733; accord Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 480 ("[The executive
branch must be exercising ... creativity, judgment, or discretion in an 'implementational' context.
In other words, the executive branch must be interpreting or enforcing a legislative choice or
judgment; its actions cannot amount to the exercise of free-standing legislative power.").
193.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
194.
343 U.S. 579. President Truman tried to seize the nation's steel mills to prevent a
possible steel shutdown during the Korean War. Id. at 582. The President's order was not based
upon any specific statutory grant of authority; indeed, Congress had refused the President's earlier
request specifically for that authority. Id. at 586. Therefore, the issue for the Court was whether the
President had power to seize private property in the absence of specifically enumerated authority in
the Constitution. Id. at 587. The President had argued that he had inherent power as Commanderin-Chief to act in light of the Korean War and because he had to "faithfully execute" the laws. Id. at
587. The Court disagreed with both arguments. Id. at 587-88.
195.
Cf. id. at 588-89.
196.
128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). Prior to Medellin, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had
held that the United States had violated international law by failing to inform Mexican nationals of
their Vienna Convention rights. Id. at 1355. In response, President Bush issued a memorandum stating
that the United States would 'discharge its international obligations ... by having State courts give
effect to the [ICJ's] decision."' Id. at 1353 (quoting Memorandum From George W. Bush, President of
the United States, to Alberto Gonzalez, the Attorney General of the United States (Feb, 28, 2005)).
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unconstitutional President George W. Bush's memorandum to require state
courts to review the convictions and sentences of foreign nationals who had
not been advised of their rights under the Vienna Convention.'" In both
cases, the presidents acted to alter legal rights without any preexisting
statutory or constitutional authority; hence, they acted unconstitutionally.
Additionally, when a branch other than the executive executes the law,
separation of powers is violated. For instance, in Bowsher v. Synar,'" the Court
held that the legislature cannot execute the law nor can it retain removal
power over someone who does.'" The removal power, according to the Court's
opinion in Myers v. United States," is executive in nature. Because executive
Relying on the ICJ's decision and the president's memorandum, Medellin filed a state habeas
application challenging his state murder conviction and death sentence. Id. Texas dismissed the application because Medellin had failed to raise the Vienna Convention claim in a timely manner. Id. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the president lacked the authority to preempt state law and
require state courts to obey international treaties and decisions of the ICJ. Id. Absent a grant of
power-from the Constitution, from a statute, or from a self-executing treaty-there was simply no
law for the president to execute. See id. at 1369. Hence, the president acted legislatively, which he
had no power to do.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
197.
In Bowsher, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the
198.
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037
(codified as amended in scattered section of 2 U.S.C.). The Act allowed the comptroller general (1)
to determine whether the President and Congress were abiding by federal deficit caps and (2) to implement
cuts as necessary. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33. Although he was appointed by the President, the
comptroller general was subject to removal by Congress. Id. at 727-28. Because the comptroller
would be executing the law, the Court struck down the law. Id. at 732-34. The Court held that
Congress could not vest any authority to execute the laws in the comptroller general because the
removal arrangement would then give Congress a role in executing the laws. Id. at 726-27, 733-34.
"The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that
Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess." Id. at 726.
Some suggest that the reasoning in this case is simply circular. Had Congress been exercising
the power delegated to the comptroller general, likely the Court would have seen the power as
legislative. Schwartz, supra note 113, at 608. Why then did the Court determine that the power was
executive? Because Congress was not exercising the power. Id. "The implication then ... is that
any power giving effect to a statute that is not exercised by the legislature or the courts must be
'executive."' Id. Regardless, had the Court concluded that the power was legislative, the Act would
still have been unconstitutional for the comptroller general's decisions were not subject to bicameral
passage and presentment. Redish & Cisar, supra note 109, at 489 (citing Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 75455 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
199.
Interestingly, the Court did allow the judiciary to execute the law. In Monison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court upheld Congress's decision to establish an independent counsel, who
was supervised by the judicial rather than the executive branch. Id. at 659-60. The independent
counsel's function was to "investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking government
officials" for criminal activity. Id. at 660. The Court approved the arrangement despite expressly
conceding that the power to investigate and to prosecute crimes was executive. Id. at 671. This
finding would have ended the inquiry under formalism, for the legislative branch cannot
constitutionally vest executive power in the judicial branch. Instead, the Court employed functionalism
and upheld the power distribution. See id. at 670-77.
200.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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staff have executive authority, the legislature cannot retain the power to advise
on and consent to their removal.201
Thus, executive acts are those acts that require a government official to
interpret existing law and to exercise judgment in applying that law to a
given situation. If there is no existing law to apply, whether in the form of a
statute or treaty, then the executive cannot act. Admittedly, the delegation
doctrine blurs this distinction: The executive has a role in lawmaking when
Congress entrusts the executive with such power and provides some guiding
principles for exercising that power. But once Congress enacts a law, Congress can have no role in executing that law, including the power to remove
those with executive power.
c.

Judicial Acts

While legislating is the quintessential legislative act and executing the
law is the quintessential executive act, interpreting the law is the quintessential judicial act.202 "Legislatures prescribe the rights and duties of citizens, while
interpreting laws setting forth those rights and duties is the province of the
courts."203 Simply stated, the legislature makes law, and the judiciary says
what that law means. As has been oft quoted:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.... This is of the very
essence of judicial duty.204
Only the judiciary can dispositively interpret laws to resolve legal disputes.205 While the legislature has the power to write and to enact laws, it is
Compare id. at 115-18, with Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935)
201.
(holding that the executive did not have implicit power to remove quasi-legislative officers from office
without express authority from Congress).
202.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.").
203.
Bell, supra note 80, at 18 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523, 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
204.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
205.
Indeed, only Article III courts have this power. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982). Before Northem Pipeline, Congress had established federal bankruptcy
courts within the executive branch. Congress gave bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over all "civil
proceedings arising under [the Bankruptcy code] or arising in or related to cases under [the Bankruptcy
code]." Id. at 54 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976)). Additionally, the bankruptcy judges
had most of the "powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty." Id. at 55 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1481
(Supp. IV 1976)). But unlike Article III judges, who are appointed for life (subject to impeachment)
and whose salary cannot be reduced while in office, bankruptcy judges were appointed for fourteenyear terms, and their salary was subject to readjustment. Id. at 60-61. The Court held that Congress
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the judiciary that must interpret those laws in the course of adjudicating a
case.20 ' Indeed, a court's fundamental power is "to decide cases according to
[its] own legal interpretations and factual findings"20 7 "to render dispositive
judgments."' Neither the executive nor the legislature can decide cases or
review a federal court's determinations. 2 ' The Supreme Court has been clear
that when another branch intrudes on the judiciary's right to resolve disputes
conclusively, separation of powers is violated."o For example, in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,2" the Court held that Congress could not retroactively
require federal courts to reopen final judgments.212
The judicial role is fundamentally different from the legislative role. "To
declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power, to declare what the
law shall be is legislative.""' The prohibition against Congress enacting "rules
of decision" is illustrative. In United States v. Klein,214 the Court invalidated a
statute that prescribed "rule[s] of decision." 215 According to the Court,

could not grant Article III powers to non-Article Ill judges, who lacked lifetime tenure and salary
protection and, thus, might not be politically independent. Id. at 84. In a plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan explained that the Article Ill protections-life tenure and salary protection-helped the
judiciary retain political independence from the executive and legislative branches. See id. at 64
n.15, 67-69.
206.
"A fundamental precept of the federal constitutional structure ... is the distinction between
a legislature's power to enact laws and acourt's authority to interpret them in the course of adjudicating
a case." Araiza, supra note 170, at 1055 (criticizing the Court's holding in Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), for failing to check legislative usurpation of judicial power).
207.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1073.
208.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990).
209.
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (holding that the judiciary could be compelled

to hear veterans' disability pension claims, which were not judicial in nature); accord Bates v. Kimball, 2
D.Chip 77,90 (Vt. 1824).
210.
Illustratively, in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the concurrence criticized "the
Legislature of [Connecticut, for it] ha[d] been in the uniform, uninterrupted, habit of exercising ageneral
superintending power over its courts of law, by granting new trials." Id. at 398 (Iredell, J.,
concurring). "[The] power to grant, with respect to suits depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new
privileges of proceeding, not previously recognized and regulated by positive institutions ... is judicial in
its nature ... not legislative . . . ." Id.
211.
514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).
In holding that Congress could not "retroactively command[ I the federal courts to reopen
212.
final judgments" without violating separation of powers, the Court reasoned that the judiciary's role
is "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them" conclusively. Id. at 218-19.
Town of Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668, 678 (1881).
213.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
214.
Id. at 146. After the Civil War, Congress had passed the Abandoned and Captured
215.
Property Act, which allowed owners of property confiscated during the war to receive the proceeds from
the sale of that property so long as the owner had never given any aid to the Southern rebellion.
Pursuant to his pardoning authority, President Lincoln had offered to pardon anyone who had
supported the Confederate Army so long as that person took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. The pardon fully restored property rights. See id. at 139-40
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by prescribing a rule of decision in a pending case, Congress "inadvertently
passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power."2 16 By
"withhold[ing] appellate jurisdiction [ ] as a means to an end[,]" 21 7 Congress had
invaded the province of the judicial branch.218 Pursuant to Klein, Congress
may change the underlying substantive law to accomplish its policy objectives,
but it may not "dictate results under existing law."219 Thus, when Congress
interferes with specific, pending cases to tell the judiciary what decision to
reach in a case, Congress impermissibly intrudes into the judicial arena.220
The line between dictating results and altering underlying policy can be
difficult to draw. In Miller v. French,221 the Court rejected the argument that a
In response, Congress limited the president's pardon power. Additionally, Congress made acceptance of a pardon conclusive evidence that the person pardoned had supported the Confederate Army
and that the person was, therefore, ineligible to recover property sale proceeds. The Supreme Court
was directed to dismiss any case for lack of jurisdiction when the claimant had prevailed as a result of
receiving a pardon. See id. at 141-44. In Klein, the Court held Congress's actions unconstitutional
because the legislation required the federal courts to exercise judicial power in a manner contrary to
Article Ill. Id. at 146-47. Simply put, the Constitution vests the judicial power in the judicial
branch and Congress may not interfere with the functioning of the judiciary. Id.
216.
Id. at 147. But see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)
(holding that the Northwest Timber Compromise, in which Congress stated that the statutory
requirements for two lawsuits identified by name and caption number were met, did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine).
Klein, 80 U.S. at 145.
217.
218.
Id. at 147. The Court also held that Congress had impermissibly infringed the power of
the executive branch by limiting the effect of a presidential pardon. Id.
219.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1061. Professor Araiza notes that Klein is not an easy decision
for courts to apply or commentators to understand. For a description of some of the Klein analysis,
see Araiza, supra note 170, at 1074-75.
220.
But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-14 (1869) (holding that Congress
could eliminate the Court's appellate jurisdiction in a pending case without violating the
Constitution). Subsequent commentators have criticized the Court's decision in McCardle, suggesting
that it was a result of the political atmosphere. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures From the Constitutional Plan, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1593-1615 (1986) (detailing McCardle and the political climate surrounding
the Court's decision). Despite the holding in Klein, Congress continues to create "rules of decision"
for particular cases. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 170, at 1067 (arguing that Congress prescribed a rule
of decision in an appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior).
221.
530 U.S. 327 (2000). Twenty years before Miller was filed, four federal prison inmates had
filed a class action lawsuit challenging their confinement conditions. Id. at 331-32. The court
issued an injunction, which was still in effect in 1995 when Congress enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66. Miller, 530 U.S. at 332.
PLRA allowed defendants in such cases to challenge existing injunctions and stayed the injunction
for thirty days after any such motion to terminate was filed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2). The prison
filed its motion, and the prisoners moved to enjoin the automatic stay, arguing that PLRA
"encroacheld] on the central prerogatives of the Judiciary and thereby violate[d] the separation of
powers doctrine." Miller, 530 U.S. at 342. Separation of powers was violated, the prisoners argued,
because the injunction governing living conditions at the prison was a final judgment. Id. By legislatively
suspending a final judgment, Congress impermissibly usurped judicial power in violation of the
principles of Plaut, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), and Haybum's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). Id. The prisoners
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statute that stayed injunctions in pending litigation reopened final decisions
or interfered with judicial decisionmaking. Reasoning that the Act "establish[ed] new standards for prospective relief,"222 the Court concluded that
Congress had acted entirely within its power. Congress had not told "'judges
when, how, or what to do."'223 Rather, Congress simply changed the rules for
the future because it was unhappy with the past. Congress has this power.
At bottom then, the judicial role is to decide cases conclusively by
interpreting and applying existing law to a specific, factual situation. When
either the executive or legislature attempts to decide cases, reopen final cases,
or interfere with the decisionmaking process, separation of powers is violated.
2.

Functional Principles

The justices of the Supreme Court have never collectively embraced
formalism. Rather, the Court has oscillated between formalism and functionalism throughout its history. With a government confronted with the
complexity of the twenty-first century, functionalism seems to be winning
the war.
Functionalism's focus differs from formalism's. Formalists focus on
separation; functionalists focus on balancing inevitable overlap. Functionalists'
core concern is that one branch not take away or be given too much constitutionally assigned power from another branch. In an effort to preserve the
relative power distribution among the branches, functionalists minimize, but
do not bar completely, encroachments into the core functions of each branch.224
Core functions are those functions assigned to each branch by the
Constitution. For example, the executive's power of appointment, detailed in
Article II, is a core function. 225 But it is not absolute. The Constitution gives
the executive the power to appoint principal officers, subject to congressional
approval, but not to appoint inferior officers.226 Congress can delegate the
also argued that the PLRA violated Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872). Id. at 335. The Court rejected both
arguments, reasoning that PLRA did not suspend or reopen a decided case. Id. at 346. Rather,
PLRA "establish[ed] new standards for prospective relief," which is entirely within Congress's power. Id.
222.
Id.
223.
Id. (quoting French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 449 (1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc)).
224.
Strauss, supra note 102, at 489 (stating that the "functional approach ... stresses core
function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not
threatened"); Eric D. Greenberg, Falsificationas Functionalism: Creatinga New Model of Separation of
Powers, 4 SETON HALL CONT. L. 467, 515 (1994).
225.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
226.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113 (1976). In this case, the Court invalidated a statute
that created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) because Congress had encroached on the
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power to appoint inferior officers.227 Of course, this begs the question: How
should inferior be defined? The Court has not yet answered definitively."'
The removal power is also constitutionally assigned to the executive, though
the assignment is implicit."9 It too is not absolute; Congress can condition the
executive's power to remove executive officers,230 but not eliminate it altogether.' Importantly, the vesting clauses define the most central core functions:
the legislature legislates,232 the judiciary adjudicates,233 and the executive
executes the law.' But unlike formalism, under functionalism these core
functions are not sacrosanct.235 For example, under formalism, the role of the
judiciary might be characterized as being that of "faithful agent" to the legispresident's appointment power. The statute specifically allowed the president to appoint only two of
the FEC's six members. Id. Congress reserved the right to appoint the remaining four members.
Id. The Court reasoned that the members were principal officers because of the nature of their job
duties; hence, the president had the constitutional right to appoint them. Id. at 126. If the president
had to share this power, his position as head of the executive branch would be "unduly dilute[d]."
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 596.
227.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that Congress could give the judiciary
the power to appoint an inferior officer). Although the act at issue in Morrison empowered the
judiciary to appoint and to oversee the inferior officer who would perform executive functions, the Court
did not invalidate the act as it would likely have done had it used formalism.
228.
The Court has taken an ocular (as in "I know it when I see it") approach to this issue. See
id. at 671.
229.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126-27 (1926); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
230.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686. At issue in Morrison was the removal provision in the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000): The Attorney General, a member of the
executive branch, had the sole and unreviewable power to remove any independent counsel, but
only for "good cause." Id. This removal provision presented two issues for the Court: whether the
"good cause" provision impinged on the president's Article II functions, and whether the entirety of
the act violated separation of powers by impinging on the president's control of prosecutorial functions. Id. The Court rejected both arguments. Recognizing that it had previously found statutes
unconstitutional when Congress had reserved for itself the power to remove executive officers, the
Court found no such problem here where Congress had given removal power to the executive, even
though the removal power was not absolute. Id. The Court also noted that the president retained
the power to supervise and control the counsel's power. Id. at 695-96. Thus, because the executive
retained the ability to control and, ultimately, fire any independent counsel, the president's core
functions were not unduly burdened. Id. at 691.
Justice Scalia, taking a formalistic approach, passionately disagreed. He argued that the Act
intruded into one of the executive branch's core constitutional functions. Id. at 709 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). "It is not for [the Court] to determine, and [it has] never presumed to determine, how
much of the purely executive powers of government must be within the full control of the President
[because t]he Constitution prescribes that they all are." Id. According to Justice Scalia, when the
Constitution specifically vests power in one branch; no intrusions are acceptable.
231.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725-26 (1986); Myers, 272 U.S. at 127 (both holding
that the president has unfettered power to remove executive officials so as to control the operation of
the executive branch).
232.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
233.
Id. art. Ill, § 2.
234.
Id. art. II, § 1.
235.
See infra notes 237-243 and accompanying text.
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lature."' The legislature writes a law, the judiciary interprets the law as the
legislature directed, and the legislature corrects any errors after the fact. The judiciary should not make law, and the legislature should not adjudicate.
In contrast, under functionalism, the judiciary is more like a "partner" to
the legislature."' Functionalism recognizes that lawmaking is not exclusively
within the legislature's control; rather, the legislature and judiciary are partners
in the lawmaking process. While a core legislative function is to make law,
the judiciary also makes law in the form of common law."' Moreover, even
when it interprets statutes, the judiciary makes law because "[the meaning of
the law before and after a judicial decision is not the same." Indeed, "[t]he
interpretation of a single statute affects the interpretation of all statutes"240
because statutes are read in pari materia.241
When the judiciary interprets statutes, it acts as a "junior partner" 24 2 to
the legislature: The legislature crafts a statute to further specific policy choices,
while the judiciary, via interpretation, helps ensure that the statute accomplishes
those policy choices.2 43 Together, the two branches work together, acting in
relative parity, rather than autocracy. Although some encroachment will
occur, undue encroachment is problematic.

236.
Many commentators have identified the limitations of this view of the judicial role. E.g.,
Barak, supra note 8, at 34-35 (arguing that the role of the judiciary in statutory interpretation is one
of junior partner rather than agent); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989) (claiming that "federal judges are not the agents of
Congress[, tiheir employer is not the Congress but the United States, and their ultimate allegiance is
to the Constitution rather than to the House and Senate"); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury
in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory
Interpretation,96 NW. U. L.REV. 1239, 1253 (2002) (stating that the "faithful agent theory has never
offered a wholly adequate basis for judicial power").
237.
For the classic debate between Professors John Manning and William Eskridge, Jr. regarding
this issue, compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.REV. 1, 23
(2001), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 881-93 (2001) (criticizing Manning's
article), with John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory InterpretationFrom the Constitution, 101
COLUM L.REV. 1648, 1651-53 (2001) (responding to Professor Eskridge's criticism).
Some suggest that it is not the judiciary's function to make law: "If judges were to stray
238.
from their statutory instructions and make law themselves, there would be reason to question the
legitimacy of Marbury's holding." Molot, supra note 236, at 1241. This articulation is inaccurate, for
judges make law continuously, whether through common law or by interpreting statutes. Barak,
supra note 8, at 23.
239.
Id.
240.
Id. at 26.
241.

In pari materia literally means "part of the same material." JELLUM, supra note 78, at 99.

This linguistic canon directs that new statutes should be harmoniously interpreted with existing statutes
concerning related subjects. Id. at 101.
242.
Barak, supra note 8, at 26.
243.
See id. at 34.
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Encroachment into a core function alone, however, is not enough to
violate separation of powers under functionalism, as it would be under
formalism. For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,"
the Court held that Congress can delegate to the executive the power to
adjudicate a limited, "particularized area of law."245 In that case, the litigants
had argued that the Constitution prohibited Congress from authorizing a
federal agency to adjudicate common law counterclaims.246 The Court
rejected this argument as "formalistic and unbending."247 According to the
Court, the power arrangement "raise[ed] no question of the aggrandizement
of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch.""' In other
words, separation of powers was not violated simply because Congress may
have enabled the executive to encroach on a judicial function. Violation of
separation of powers required a finding that Congress had correspondingly
expanded, or aggrandized, the executive's power."4 Illustratively, the Court
had earlier denied a broader judicial power grant to a non-Article III
bankruptcy court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.2"o But in Schor, the Court distinguished Northern Pipeline: "[T]he [Act at
issue] leaves far more of the 'essential attributes of judicial power' to Article
III courts than did that portion of the Bankruptcy Act found unconstitutional
in Northern Pipeline.""' Simply put, the power transfer in Schor was not intrusive enough to raise aggrandizement concerns.
Using similar reasoning, the Court approved Congress's delegation of
limited legislative-like powers to the judiciary. In Mistretta v. United States"'
244.
478 U.S. 833 (1986). The litigants in that case had challenged regulations that gave
power to a federal administrative agency to adjudicate state, common-law issues. Sustaining the power
shift, the Court looked to the purpose of Article III. Id. at 847. According to the Court, that
purpose was two-fold: to protect the independence of the judiciary and to safeguard litigants' rights to
have decisions made by judges free from domination by the other branches. Id. at 848. Because the
appellant in Schor had agreed to have the administrative law judge hear its claim, it had waived
the second concern. Id. at 849. As for the first concern, the Court specifically rejected a formal
analysis in favor of a balancing test which weighed the extent to which Article III powers had been
delegated to a non-Article III tribunal with "the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III." Id. at 851. In this case, the congressional scheme did "not impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary," id. at 851-52, and the jurisdictional grant was for a
limited, "particularized area of law." Id. at 852 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)). The Court upheld the statute.
245.
Id.(quoting N. Pipeline Consr. Co., 458 U.S. at 85).
246.
Id.at 847.
Id.at 851.
247.
248.
Id.at 856.
249.
Id.at 856-57.
250.
458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982).
251.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 852.
252.
488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989).
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the Court upheld the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
even though three of the seven commission members were sitting federal
judges."' The Court was unconcerned that members of the judiciary would
be drafting sentencing guidelines.' The Court reasoned that the work that
the Commission was doing was similar to establishing court rules; therefore,
"the Commission's functions ... [were] clearly attendant to a central element
of the historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch.""' Hence,
any intrusion was minimal, already tolerated, and thus acceptable.
And in Morrison v. Olson,"' the Court found no aggrandizement concern.
At issue in that case was the Ethics in Government Act by which Congress
delegated the power to appoint an inferior officer to the judiciary. In reaching
its holding that the delegation was constitutional, the Court reasoned that
the appointment procedure did not present a situation in which Congress had
"increaseled] its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.""
Thus, because this case did not "pose a 'dange[r] of congressional usurpation
of Executive Branch functions,"' 258 separation of powers was not violated.
Although the Framers were concerned about the concentration of
governmental power in any one of the three branches, they were primarily
concerned with congressional self-aggrandizement.259 Perhaps for this reason,
the Court more closely scrutinizes legislation that expands Congress's authority
than legislation that results in judicial or executive aggrandizement.26 The
analysis in Morrison,where the Court focused on the shift of power away from
Congress, supports this hypothesis. The Court did not explicitly evaluate
whether Congress had aggrandized the judiciary's power at the executive's
expense or whether Congress had aggrandized itself simply by weakening the
presidency. Specifically, the Court failed to recognize that by taking power
away from the executive, Congress likely made that office weaker and itself
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 391.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

257.

Id. at 694 (emphasis added).

Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)). Rather, Congress retained no
258.
power to control or supervise the independent counsel other than impeachment, which applied to all

officers of the United States. Id. The Court noted that: "Congress' role under the Act is limited to
receiving reports or other information and oversight of the independent counsel's activities,
functions that we have recognized generally as being incidental to the legislative function of

Congress." Id.(citation omitted).
259.

Elliott, supra note 5, at 528-29 (citing Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-24 (identifying the

Founders' fear of legislative interference with executive function)).
260.
Hui, supra note 102, at 1405-06; accord Ronald J. Krotoszynski, On the Danger of Wearing
Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417, 480 (1997) (suggesting
that the Court's distinction between these types of aggrandizement is "precisely backwards").
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stronger. Moreover, the Court did not expressly evaluate whether Congress
had aggrandized the judiciary's power at the executive's expense, although
arguably Congress did so by allowing the judiciary to appoint and to oversee
an executive officer. Implicit in the opinion, however, is a finding that
Congress had not aggrandized the judiciary because the executive retained
(1) the ability to remove the independent counsel for good cause and (2) the
power to supervise and control the counsel's activities." Thus, while aggrandizement is a concern, legislative aggrandizement is of particular concern.
In sum, under functionalism, separation of powers is violated when
constitutionally assigned power is transferred among the branches in a way
that inappropriately aggrandizes one branch while withdrawing constitutionally
assigned power from another.262 Although formalism and functionalism share
a common goal to ensure that no one branch acquires too much unilateral
power,263 these approaches go about meeting this goal in different ways.
Whereas formalism uses a bright-line-rule approach to categorize acts as legislative, judicial, or executive,2 6 functionalism uses a factors approach, balancing
the competing power interests with the pragmatic need for innovation."
Functionalists do not want to "unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed
and innovative action....266 In other words, functionalists balance Constitutional and pragmatic concerns, recognizing that government needs flexibility
to create new power-sharing arrangements to address the evolving needs of the
modern century.
To allow flexibility, functionalists focus less on maintaining separateness. Rather, functionalists favor independence with oversight; each branch
must be able to perform its core functions while also being able to limit the
accretion of power by the other branches.262 Justice Jackson's tripartite
framework from Youngstown is informative. According to Justice Jackson,
the Court should review separation of powers issues differently depending
upon the level of cooperation among the other two branches:
261.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-78.
262.
Greenberg, supra note 224, at 515.
263.
See Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 177, at 1201-02.
264.
See supra Part IlI.B.1.
265.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) ("Among the
factors [to be balanced] ... are the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are
reserved to Article Ill courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article Ill forum
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins
and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from
the requirements of Article III.").
266.
Id.
267.
Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 177, at 1202 (identifying functionalism as a "checks and
balances" approach).
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First, "[wihen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate." Second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either
a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." In this circumstance, Presidential authority can
derive support from "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence."
Finally, "[wihen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,"
and the Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject."2 68

Although Justice Jackson was addressing executive power, his framework
applies more globally: When one branch acts unilaterally against the express
or implied will of the other branches, the risk of tyranny is at its greatest.
The Constitution's checks and balances also act as a "self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of another."2 69 There are numerous check and balance provisions
littered throughout the Constitution. For example, Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts provides a check on the power of the
judiciary to resolve cases, but each branch remains able to act independently.270 Similarly, each house of Congress formulates its internal rules
independently of the other house.2 7' The Arrest, Speech, and Debate Clause
helps ensure that the members of Congress can formulate laws as they wish,
can say what they wish to say however they wish to say it, can travel freely to
their respective chambers, and can be free from arrest while doing all of
this.272 The Incompatibility Clause prohibits members of Congress from
serving within the executive branch.2" This clause helps ensure that

268.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (citations omitted).
Magill, supra note 98, at 1149 (describing the formalist and functionalist approaches to
269.
separation of powers).
270.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1072-73.
271.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.").
Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("The Senators and Representatives... shall in all Cases... be
272.
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not
be questioned in any other Place.").
273.
Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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members of Congress remain free to legislate without executive influence."'
Under other clauses, the executive has the power to veto bills,"' and the
Senate has the power to advise and to consent to the appointment of executive and judicial officials.2 76 There are other examples, but this much should
be clear: The Constitution diffuses power among the branches while
simultaneously recognizing that the branches must work together to run
government.277 Each branch has its separate, constitutionally assigned functions, yet each branch also has a penumbra of overlap that shades gradually
into the core functions of the other two branches. So long as the branches
steer relatively clear of the other branches' core functions and so long as the
branches do not enlarge their own power at the expense of another branch,
separation of powers is maintained.
In summary, functionalists take a pragmatic view of separation of powers
and seek to avoid any branch aggrandizing its own power while encroaching
upon another branch's constitutionally delineated power.27 Whereas
formalists ask what kind of power is being wielded and whether the appropriate branch is wielding that power, functionalists ask whether one branch has
unduly encroached into the core functions of another branch and aggrandized
itself.279 Illustratively:
[I]f the Supreme Court were to void a presidential pardon because it
was given for improper motives,.. . if the Court were to void a Senate
impeachment proceeding because it had defects, . . . if the Court were

to order the President to dismiss a Secretary of State who was facing
274.
Bruhl, supra note 107, at 410. This clause helps ensure that members of Congress cannot
become beholden to the executive, just like members of the executive branch cannot become beholden
to Congress. See the discussion of Myers supra Part Ill.B.1(b).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
275.
Id. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
276.
277.
As Justice Jackson said in Youngstown:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even
single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
278.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at 122-23, 139; see Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, PrivatiZation,and
Globalization: Separationof Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign FederalPower to Non-Federal
Actors, 50 RuTGERS L. REv. 331, 338-39 (1998) ("Under [separation of powers], the Court employs
four principles. First, the Court requires strict adherence to the express procedures contained in the
Constitution's text. Second, Congress may not aggrandize itself by exceeding the outer limits of its
power. Thus, Congress may not assign itself power that is not legislative or 'in aid of the legislative
function.' Third, Congress may not impede the ability of another branch to perform its constitutional
role. Finally, Congress may not delegate the legislative power vested in it by Article 1,Section 1.").
279.
Strauss, supra note 102, at 489.
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criminal proceedings, the Court would violate the principle of separation of powers.
In all of these examples, the issue would not be whether the Court had
the power to act-the Court likely has the power to require the executive
and the legislature to obey the Constitution."' Rather, the issue would be
whether, in doing so, the Court would impede the executive's or the legislature's ability to carry out core functions and in the process aggrandize its role.
In sum, power given or taken by one branch must not "intru[de] on the
authority and functions of [another] Branch."282 Intrusions that impair another
branch's ability to perform are unconstitutional unless the "impact is justified
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority
of Congress."
C.

Preventing Tyranny and Legislative Aggrandizement

Rigidly dividing separation of powers analysis into these two categories,
formalism and functionalism, is imperfect. The justices have never collectively
adopted one approach; rather, their jurisprudence vacillates between the two.
For example, on the same day the Court decided Bowsherz" using the formalist
approach,"' the Court decided Schor28 6 using a functionalist approach.8
Sometimes, the opinions blend elements of both.288 Indeed, some critics 2 89
have suggested that the Court relies on the formalist approach when it wants
to invalidate a particular power distribution, such as the line-item veto2 90 and
legislative veto,2 9' but relies on the functionalist approach to validate other
280.
Barak, supra note 8, at 122.
281.
See id. at 122 n.389 (citing Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring) (suggesting that judicial review may be warranted if the Senate impeached a person
"upon a coin toss")).
282.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).
283.
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
284.
285.
Id. at 722-26.
286.
Commodity & Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 847-48. In doing so, the Court emphasized the functionalist concern that
287.
"'practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform
application of Article III."' Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
587 (1985)).
288.
Magill, supra note 98, at 1138.
289.
E.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 260, at 480 (arguing that the Court uses a formalist
approach to non-Article Ill encroachments and a functionalist approach to Article Ill encroachments).
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the line-item veto
290.
violated separation of powers).
291.
Magill, supra note 104, at 609-10; see, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding
that the legislative veto violated separation of powers); supra Ill.B.1.a.
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power-sharing distributions, such as the independent counsel arrangement,"'
the sentencing guidelines plan,"' and the exercise of adjudicatory authority
by administrative agencies."' In other words, the Court's jurisprudence in this
area is sufficiently inconsistent that it lends itself to criticism that it is
outcome driven.
In response, various commentators have suggested alternative approaches.295
But none of these alternatives have garnered universal following, and certainly
not among the Supreme Court justices. Underlying both functionalism and
formalism, however, are uniting concerns: fears of tyranny and legislative
aggrandizement."' Hence, the analysis of this issue should ultimately be
guided by the Framers' fear that the concentration of power in the hands of a
single branch, especially the legislature, would threaten liberty.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY DIRECTIVES

Definitional directives and theoretical directives are easier to analyze
under separation of powers than are interpretive directives. Ultimately, it is
likely irrelevant whether the Court uses a formalist or functionalist approach.
Under either approach, definitional directives do not violate separation of
powers while theoretical directives do. Below, I explain why, and then move
to the more complicated analysis: interpretive directives. Interpretive
directives seem to violate the formalist approach but not the functionalist
approach. In this case then, the Court's approach may well be outcome
determinative. To further guide the discussion, I address concerns underlying both approaches: preventing tyranny and legislative aggrandizement. I
suggest that these concerns lead the analysis to a surprising, somewhat
formalistic, conclusion: General interpretive directives likely violate separation
of powers while specific interpretive directives do not.
292.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that the independent counsel statute
did not violate separation of powers).
293.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (holding that the judiciary may
constitutionally enact sentencing guidelines).
294.
Magill, supra note 104, at 609-10.
295.
See sources cited supra note 109.
296.
In other words:
[Jiudicial review serves one principal goal: safeguarding liberty from the threat of tyranny.
Where the political branches intrude directly on individual rights, or where they seek to
alter the balance of power among the federal branches in such a way as to make such an
intrusion more probable, the role of the courts is to intervene, to say no to the majority, and
thereby to preserve our rights and freedoms.
David R. Dow, Cassandra Jeu, Anthony C. Coveny, Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Court: An
Empirical Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 69 (2008).
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A.

Definitional Directives

Definitional directives, which define terms for one or more statutes,297 do
not violate formal or functional separation of powers.
1.

Formalist Separation of Powers

Under formalism, definitional directives do not violate separation of
powers because the legislature is simply performing a legislative act. When
the legislature enacts a definitional directive, the legislature is "affecting legal
rights." 298 Therefore, definitional directives are legislative in nature. To
understand why they are legislative, assume that a legislature defined
"buildings" in an arson statute to include vehicles. Assume further that the
legislature defined "vehicles" to include bulldozers. Then, for purposes of this
statute, a bulldozer would be a building (strange, but true).2 99 In this situation, the legislature has altered legal rights: Whereas normally bulldozers are
not considered buildings and the arson statute would not protect their
owners, the legislature has changed the norm by including bulldozers within
the protected class. Simply put, the legislature has changed the bulldozer
owner's legal status.
Similarly, consider the Defense of Marriage Act." When Congress
defined marriage as the legal union between a man and a woman,30 ' Congress altered the legal rights of all gay people. The Act had two immediate
effects: (1) No state need treat persons of the same sex as married, even
if they were considered married in another state; and (2) the federal
government could not recognize any same-sex relationship as marriage for
any purpose, even if recognized as such by a state.302 While Congress can
amend this definition at a later time, until Congress does so, marriage means
only traditional marriage for all federal purposes.303 Thus, Congress altered
297.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
298.
For a discussion of what acts are legislative under this approach, see supra Part II.A.
299.
See Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Ky. 2002) (holding that a bulldozer
is a vehicle and thus protected by the arson statute prohibiting the intentional burning of buildings).
300.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
301.
Id. (stating that "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife").
302.
Id. For example, Massachusetts currently recognizes gay marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
303.
Another example is the Dictionary Act, in which Congress defined the word "person" to
include "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals." I U.S.C. § 1 (2006). By doing so, Congress potentially expanded the legal
rights and responsibilities of many businesses. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 52, at 100.
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legal rights by defining "marriage." Because the legislature is performing a
legislative act by defining terms, definitional directives do not violate
formalist separation of powers.
2.

Functionalist Separation of Powers

Further, definitional directives do not violate functionalist separation of
powers because these directives neither encroach impermissibly on a core
judicial function nor aggrandize the legislative role. Practically speaking,
"[l]egislative definitions or redefinitions of statutory terms are commonplace
and generally quite desirable, as they render the legislature's intent more
precise and easily discoverable."30 4
The legislature makes law.305 Making law includes the power to define
words and phrases, to say what those words mean, and to change the dictionary
meaning of words when necessary, all which aid the reader in understanding
what the drafter intended. "Congress has a right to legislate by definition""
and can even "deem that certain conduct satisfies elements or provisions
elsewhere in the statute. 307
Definitional directives are articulations of law rather than interpretations
of law because definitional directives help ensure that the law and all of its
contours are clearly understood by judges and litigants.'" When a legislature
drafts definitions, it does not aggrandize its power or encroach on the judiciary's core function.3' Admittedly, the power to say what the law means is
a core function of the judiciary.3 o Yet, by enacting a definition, the legislature has not unreasonably encroached on this power. When the legislature
Pursuant to this definition, corporations and other entities can sue, be sued, file for bankruptcy, and
pay taxes, among other things. Cf. id. at 99 (arguing that the directive would not necessarily apply
to every future statute). Legal rights have been affected; hence, the act is legislative.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1064.
304.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§§ 1,8.
305.
Ace Waterways, Inc. v. Fleming, 98 F. Supp. 666, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (holding the
306.
definition of "steam vessel" included every vessel propelled by any form of mechanical or electrical
power because Congress defined it as such).
307.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1055 ("In the absence of such definitions or 'deeming' clauses,
such decisions are made by the courts.... [Llegislatures and courts share this power .... ).
308.
Id. at 1131. But redefinitions, when the legislature amends a statutory term, have an even
greater interpretive effect because they "alter[] the reach of the statute without purporting to change
its substance." Id.at 1064.
309.
See id. at 1055-56 (stating that when Congress does so, "questions will inevitably arise
about when one branch-usually the legislature-has unconstitutionally encroached on the
functions of the other").
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see
310.
also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 257 (2006).
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defines (or even redefines) a term, the legislature's act is "part of the ongoing
dialogue between [the] legislature and court over the original legislation's
meaning."' In other words, definitions are simply part of the enactment
process, which includes legislative enactment, judicial interpretation, and
legislative correction.312 Any encroachment is minor, even beneficial, for the
judiciary is better able to interpret the statute in a way that furthers the legislature's policy choices. Thus, the two branches work in partnership to
accomplish the legislative agenda. The judiciary remains free to interpret
statutes; it just must do so with the definition Congress provided. Thus, when
a legislature enacts a definitional directive, the legislature neither encroaches
on the judicial role nor aggrandizes its own lawmaking role; hence, definitional directives do not violate functionalist separation of powers.
B.

Theoretical Directives

"Can Congress limit the Court's sources of knowledge?""' This is
precisely the question that theoretical directives raise. Theoretical directives,
which identify what evidence a court may consider when interpreting
314
statutes, seem to violate both the formalist and functionalist approaches to
separation of powers notwithstanding pragmatic reasons supporting their use.
1.

Formalist Separation of Powers

Theoretical directives violate formalist separation of powers quite simply
because the legislature is performing a judicial act. Unlike definitional directives, theoretical directives do not affect legal rights.' Indeed, affecting legal
rights is not the purpose of theoretical directives. Instead, the purpose of
theoretical directives is to tell the judiciary what evidence to consider when
interpreting statutes.
Interpreting statutes is the quintessential judicial act."' Determining
what evidence to consider when deciding what a statute means is essential to
the interpretive process because the court is determining how it will perform
its function. When a legislature crafts a theoretical directive such as the one

311.
Araiza, supra note 170, at 1064.
312.
See id.
313.
MICHAEL L. WELLS, WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, & LARRY W. YACKLE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 492 (4th ed. 2007).

314.
315.
316.

See discussion supra Part II.C.
For a discussion of what acts are legislative under this approach, see supra Part III.B.La.
See discussion supra Part llI.B.1.c.
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adopted in Connecticut, " the legislature is not legislating; the legislature is
not trying to alter legal rights. Rather, the legislature is trying to control the
judicial function: interpreting statutes. "If officials in either of the [executive
or legislative] branches were given final say over statutory interpretation
. . . or legislators could determine the meaning of their own statutes-this
would sabotage both the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures and
the constitutional separation of powers.""' Saying what the law means is the
judiciary's job. Hence, when the legislature enacts a theoretical directive, it is
performing a judicial act, which is unconstitutional under formalist separation
of powers.
2.

Functionalist Separation of Powers

Admittedly, the Court has rarely struck down congressional power
choices while using functionalism; thus, it might also decline to do so in the case
of theoretical directives. Yet, theoretical directives seem to violate the functional approach to separation of powers. Theoretical directives raise
concerns under functionalism because they impermissibly allow Congress to
intrude into a core judicial function and aggrandize its role while simultaneously contracting the roles of the judiciary and the executive. While there
may be pragmatic reasons for allowing the legislature to aid the judiciary in its
interpretive role in this way, simply put, these directives go too far. First,
theoretical directives impermissibly intrude on the judiciary's core function to
interpret the law"' or "say what the law means."32 Saying what the law means
is not just one core function of the judiciary; it is the most central constitutionally assigned function of the judiciary, as found in the vesting clause.32' As
such, the Court should guard it jealously."'
When the Framers rejected Massachusetts's rigid version of separation of
powers, they chose a more fluid version that focuses on the independence and

317.
See discussion supra Part 1.
318.
Molot, sup'ra note 236, at 1246.
319.
U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2.
320.
Id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see GEYH,supra note 310, at 257.
321.
U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 1, cl. 1.
322.
See Kinkopf, supra note 278, at 357. The author opined:
As the guardian of its own Article Ill-assigned role, the judiciary can be expected to be somewhat
less restrained in reviewing legislation that might undermine the judiciary's ability to perform its
constitutional role. It is therefore not surprising that the only legislation ruled unconstitutional
under the general separation of powers principle has been statutes that the Court concluded
would undermine the ability of the judiciary to perform its constitutional role.
Id.
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cooperation of the branches. 23 Independence and cooperation require that
each branch retain sufficient autonomy to function effectively, while still
being subject to some oversight.324 "[E]ach branch of government deserves
the autonomy necessary to carry out its functions within the constitutional
scheme,""' and each branch should "enjoy[] a protected sphere of control over
its internal affairs."326 No branch should be able to regulate the inner workings of
any other branch." Rather, each branch must be "master in [its] own house.""
For the most part, each branch does control its internal affairs. For example, the legislature is solely in charge of the procedure by which it legislates.
Indeed, each chamber formulates its own internal rules independently of the
other chamber.329 The judiciary will not review the legality of the procedures
of a bill's passage. "[W]hen litigants challenge congressional choices regarding ... legislative procedure, the Judiciary almost invariably refuses to adjudicate the claims .... [A]t base these holdings reflect the courts' respect for

Congress' power to organize itself."' The Court could constitutionally review
these issues, but chooses not to. Thus, if a specific legislator must be present at
a vote and is not, the judiciary will not review the effect of that absence on
the validity of any successfully enacted bill."' Lawmaking is a legislative
function; the authority to make laws belongs to Congress. So too should
the mechanics of lawmaking belong to Congress. For the most part, the
judiciary cannot tell Congress how to draft laws, what procedural rules to
follow, or what policies to choose when it does so.332
323.
See discussion supra Part Il.A.
324.
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 n.5 (1977) (stating that separation of power
is not an absolute divide between the branches); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 244-45
(1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) (same); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution provides "separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
325.
Bell, supra note 80, at 7 (arguing that when the judiciary adopts an instrumental approach
to statutory interpretation because such an approach will likely affect the legislative decisionmaking
process, it violates separation of powers).
326.
Bruhl, supra note 107, at 410.
327.
Id. at 406.
328.
Id.(quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935). The master-ofthe-house concern does not apply to definitional directives because they do not relate to procedure.
329.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.").
330.
Bell, supra note 80, at 31-32 (citations omitted); see also Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 1996) ("It is entirely the prerogative of the legislature, however,
to make, interpret, and enforce its own procedural rules, and the judiciary cannot compel the
legislature to act in accordance with its own procedural rules so long as constitutional questions
are not implicated." (citations omitted)).
331.
Heimbach v. State, 454 N.Y.S.2d 993, 999 (App. Div. 1982) (refusing to review the validity of a statute even though a legislator whose vote was necessary for passage was not actually
present during the vote).
332.
See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 52, at 102. In their article, the authors posit:
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Similarly, the executive must be master over the procedure by which
executive functions are exercised."' Consider the veto process. The president is solely in charge of that process." So too, the mechanics of vetoing
should belong to the president. Congress could not tell the president that
any veto will be ineffective unless specific procedures are followed or magic
language is used. "[T]he Constitution grants the President the right to
express his objections however he likes, and Congress cannot circumscribe
how the President might express them."'
Likewise, the judiciary would not overturn a presidential pardon simply
because the president used words the judiciary did not believe were as clear as
they could have been or because the president chose to grant the pardon on
the wrong day of the week."' The mechanics of pardoning belong to the
executive, and the judiciary should not intervene.
If the judiciary cannot tell the legislature or the executive how to do their
respective jobs, and if the legislature cannot tell the executive how to do its
job, and if the executive cannot tell the judiciary or legislature how to do
their respective jobs, why then can the legislature tell the judiciary how to do its
job?' Why is it permissible for the legislature to tell the judiciary to look only at
certain information when deciding what words mean?
Congress's role in lawmaking is to be as clear as it can be, given political
and linguistic limitations. The judicial role is to take those words and give
them the meaning Congress tried to convey within a particular factual
setting. Certainly, the legislature can have a voice in interpretation and,
indeed, already does. Congress may inform itself of how legislation is being
implemented through the ordinary means of legislative investigation and
oversight. If the legislature disagrees with the result in any particular case, it
In what way does the "judicial power of the United States" grant the federal judiciary the
authority to create counterintuitive rules of interpretation that then require the Congress
affirmatively to circumvent them? We doubt that the judicial power-the power to decide
cases-gives the federal judiciary the power to dictate interpretive rules to Congress. The
courts cannot dictate (or constrain) how Congress must express itself.

Id.
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 711 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting
333.
that the executive must be master of "his own time and energy"-even his choice to avoid or delay
judicial proceedings).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,946-48 (1983).
334.
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 52, at 104.
335.
See Barak, supra note 8, at 122.
336.
There is a related question: Can the current Congress create theoretical directives which
337.
bind future congresses? That entrenchment question is beyond the scope of this Article. Alexander
& Prakash, supra note 52, at 109 ("[Wle believe that neither the federal courts nor the Congress has
any constitutional authority that enables them to require future Congresses to jump through physical
or linguistic hoops prior to legislating.").
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can legislatively overrule the decision."' In this way, statutory interpretation
becomes an ongoing dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature.
The legislature can be involved earlier in the process by issuing a
presumptive theoretical directive, which would not bind the judiciary's hands.
A presumptive theoretical directive would indicate the legislature's preferred
interpretive process-permitting the legislature an earlier influence than it
currently has-while still allowing the judiciary to maintain ultimate control
of the interpretive process. In the end, though, the judiciary must choose its
process. "[T]here seems to be little doubt that courts have the right to craft
their own rules of statutory interpretation regardless of congressional action." 9
Allowing Congress a greater role at the front end of the judicial interpretation process, a role in controlling how statutes are interpreted, would
allow Congress to become master of the interpretive process. Courts should
be able to choose the method that, in their view, best accomplishes the
job of interpreting statutes, just as the legislature chooses the best method for
drafting statutes. Hence, theoretical directives allow the legislature to unduly
encroach into the judicial sphere.
Theoretical directives also present aggrandizement concerns. Were
Congress to enact a theoretical directive, Congress could shift power away from
the judiciary to itself or to the executive. Or, Congress could shift power away
from the executive to itself. While this Article is focused on the judiciary,
aggrandizement of either of the other two branches at the judiciary's expense is
nonetheless concerning.
To understand how congressional aggrandizement at the executive's
expense could occur, assume that Congress passed a theoretical directive that
required a court to consider committee reports in every case of interpretation,
or to give legislative history priority over statutory text, or to use one dictionary
exclusively. Such directives would allow Congress to bypass the prescribed
constitutional process for future legislation by putting essential information
into a document that would not be subject to bicameral passage or presentment. Thus, Congress would prospectively expand its ability to legislate
beyond what the Constitution allows, which is a formalist concern. But, by
doing so, Congress would aggrandize its own role at the expense of the executive because the constitutionally assigned veto and approval power, which
belong to the executive, would be impacted. The president has no power to
veto a committee report (or other legislative history), even one at odds with
338.
See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1994) (listing eight
decisions legislatively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
339.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 750.
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proposed text.5" Although the president has the ability to veto the bill itself,
the language of the bill might be unobjectionable, even ideal, to the president.
Yet, the president would have no choice but to first read all the legislative
history and then to exercise the veto power to prevent the judiciary from
interpreting a perfectly acceptable statute in unexpected ways.'
Theoretical directives could also aggrandize the executive's power at the
expense of the judiciary. Assume, for example, that Congress enacted a statute
that directed courts to defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a
statute regardless of whether that interpretation was reasonable or comported
with the text. In this situation, Congress would have aggrandized the executive's
role in interpretation, eliminating the judiciary's oversight role altogether.342
Once an agency interprets a statute, the judiciary would have no power to reject
the interpretation, even if the interpretation were contrary to the enacted text,
legislative intent, or purpose.
And theoretical directives have the potential to aggrandize Congress at
the expense of the judiciary, the Framers' greatest concern."' Assume, for
example, that Congress directed the judiciary to never consider legislative
history when interpreting statutes, regardless of whether the language was
ambiguous or lead to absurd results. If legislative history could never be considered, what should a court do when presented with ambiguity or absurdity?
This situation is not completely hypothetical. Congress enacted a specific
theoretical directive similar to this example in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.344 That directive, section 105(b), stated that "[n]o statements other
than [a specific interpretive memorandum] shall be considered legislative
history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or
applying, any provision of this Act ... .
The identified memorandum did
little more than indicate Congress's unhappiness with a particular Supreme
340.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 7, cl. 2 (providing that only "Bills" may be vetoed by the president).

341.
Indeed, one chamber of Congress, whichever branch authored the relevant committee
report or legislative history, could aggrandize its own power to enact legislation over the other chamber
and the executive.
342.
See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Administrative

Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (2008) (suggesting that Chevron U.S.A Inc., v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), provides the appropriate framework for the relationship between
the executive, the primary decider, and the judiciary, the overseer).

343.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
344.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000) (2006)). Similarly, Congress enacted a specific theoretical directive in the U.S.
Copyright Act's definition of "work for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (see supra note 50 for the precise
language of the directive). After the definition, Congress specifically directed the courts to ignore the
fact that it had amended the statute in 1999, and then deleted the amendment in 2000. Id.
345.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.No. 102-106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. H§ 1981-2000) (2006)) (Legislative History for 1991 Amendment).
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Court caseM6 and direct the judiciary to interpret language in the Civil Rights
Act according to the jurisprudence that existed prior to that case.3 17 Yet, the
jurisprudence that existed prior to that case was uncertain at best.3 " Hence,
Congress shifted power by interfering with the interpretive process.
Traditionally, the judiciary has made the choice of what materials to
consider in the face of ambiguity and absurdity. But with such a directive,
the judiciary's hands have been tied. Congress has decided for the judiciary
what information is relevant and prevented the judiciary from looking
beyond this information. Thus, by assuming control of this process, Congress
has aggrandized its role at the expense of the judiciary, for part of the
interpretive role is deciding what evidence is relevant to meaning.
Interpreting the law to further Congress's policy choices is the quintessential judicial function. Theoretical directives that "instruct[ I courts to accord
executive construction of statutes no deference, [and those] establishing the
significance of a failure to enact a law disapproving an agency regulation,
relate less clearly to particular substantive legislative decisions.",,o Because
they relate less to specific policy choices and more to interpretive methodology,
Congress's involvement is troubling. Certainly, Congress has the primary
role in choosing policy, but Congress can have no more than an advisory role
in selecting the interpretive process. When a legislature chooses the approach
to judicial decisionmaking in statutory interpretation cases, the legislature
gains a role in the judicial function and thereby invades the province of the
judiciary. This result is troubling at best, unconstitutional at worst.
To be sure, there are pragmatic reasons functionalists could cite for
allowing theoretical directives. Theoretical directives might reduce legislation costs. It is time consuming and not always effective for the legislature to
wait for the judiciary to make a mistake and then to fix that mistake.
Allowing the legislature to have a say at the start of the process might eliminate the need for corrective legislation. Theoretical directives might "spare

346.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 90 U.S. 424 (1989).
347.
The legislative history of section 105(b) shows that members of Congress could not agree
on how to define "business necessity." El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 241-42 (3d Cir.
2007). Section 105(b) was a compromise: Wards Cove was not explicitly overruled, yet the judiciary
was directed to look to prior law for the definition. Id.
348.
WELLS ET AL., supra note 313, at 490-92.
349.
See El, 479 F.3d at 241 (stating "some may be skeptical of Congress's power to instruct
courts what legislative history they may take into account when interpreting a statute.
350.
Bell, supra note 80, at 31.
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legislators the costs of anticipating all possible interpretive problems and
legislating solutions for them."'
Theoretical directives might also reduce litigation costs. These directives could help frame and organize the inquiry for litigants and the judiciary.
While the statutory language facing a court will differ in each case, the
approach to resolving any conflict would remain constant with a theoretical
directive. Simply put, theoretical directives might promote judicial efficiency
by identifying, for both courts and litigants, the steps that should be taken in
every case to resolve statutory issues.352 Moreover, theoretical directives should
reduce the overall amount of litigation because if the potential litigants
know in advance how statutes will be interpreted, then, arguably, these litigants will interpret language accurately and more easily for themselves,
rather than seek judicial resolution. As a result these directives may further
judicial economy."
Despite these pragmatic benefits, however, theoretical directives remain
problematic. They fundamentally alter the relationship of the judiciary and
legislature. If the role of the judiciary is that of "junior partner" to the legislature, then theoretical directives upset this balance. The sole purpose for a
theoretical directive is to tell the judiciary what sources of meaning to consider
when interpreting statutes. Determining what sources of meaning to consult
in interpreting a statute is essential to the interpretive process." Contrariwise,
identifying the sources of meaning that can be consulted is irrelevant to the
lawmaking function. In essence, with theoretical directives, the legislature
micromanages the judiciary as it performs its constitutionally assigned job.
When a legislature controls the constitutionally assigned job of another
branch, the legislature impermissibly intrudes into that branch's core function.
351.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 748 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 533, 540 (1983)); accord KENNETH C. DAVIs, 4 ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 28.07
(West 1958) (summarizing the common law of reviewability as it applies to administrative law).
352.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 748.
353.
Yet the experience of the states with directives does not seem to support this argument.
Connecticut's example is instructive. After the legislative response to State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562
(Conn. 2003), the Connecticut courts were supposed to look at legislative history and other sources of
meaning much less frequently. The theoretical directive was clear: Extratextual sources of meaning
would be relevant only when statutes were ambiguous or absurd. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l-2z
(West 2007). Despite the directive, with limited exception, in every Connecticut Supreme Court case
following the legislature's enactment through 2008, the court found the text of the statute at issue
ambiguous. In other words, the Connecticut judiciary has essentially ignored the directive from its
legislature. Perhaps the court has recognized, even without explicitly acknowledging, that its legislature
impermissibly intruded into the judicial arena. Research on file with author.
See supra Part Ill.B.2.
354,
355.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 750 ("Courts historically have reserved for themselves the power
to fashion these interpretive rules.").
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If Congress were to codify an approach to interpretation, Congress would give
itself a say in the process where, constitutionally, it "should have no voice.""'
"[Tlhe sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own
house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is
master there.""' Ours is a government in which each branch has its core
functions; each branch must also have the autonomy to choose the best
method to perform those core functions, lest tyranny or aggrandizement result.
C.

Interpretive Directives

This category is the most difficult to analyze; however, I believe that
interpretive directives, which tell the judiciary how to interpret or construe
statutes, ' violate formalist-but not functionalist-separation of powers.
Hence, my analysis cannot stop with these two approaches. Instead, I look to
the possibility that these directives would permit tyranny or legislative aggrandizement and conclude that the Court should find that general interpretive
directives violate separation of powers. General interpretive directives
are unconstitutional because they interfere with the process of interpretation,
much like theoretical directives, allowing for legislative aggrandizement. In
contrast, specific interpretive directives seem less troubling because they are
designed to promote specific policy choices arrived at via the constitutionally
prescribed legislative process.
1.

Formalist Separation of Powers

Interpretive directives violate formalist separation of powers. Unlike
definitional directives, interpretive directives do not give or take rights away;
rather, they tell the courts how the legislature wants its laws interpreted. A
statute that requires the judiciary to interpret statutes broadly does not alone
affect legal rights or duties.359 For example, a bulldozer owner does not gain
legal rights simply because an arson statute indicates that its provisions
should be construed narrowly or broadly. Similarly, gay individuals would not
gain or lose legal rights if Congress were to direct that DOMA be broadly or
narrowly interpreted. Nor would criminal defendants lose specific legal rights

356.

Bruhl, supra note 107, at 349 ("When the legislature statutizes the rules of debate, it gives

the president a say in a sphere of activity where, constitutionally speaking, he should have no voice.").
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977) (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v.
357.
United States, 295 U.S. 602,630 (1935)).
See discussion supra Part 11.B.
358.
359.
For a discussion of what acts are legislative under this approach, see supra Part ll.B.1.a.
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because Congress directed the judiciary to ignore the rule of lenity in all
penal cases. Instead, in all of these cases, it is the underlying statute-the
arson statute, DOMA, or the penal statute-that would affect legal rights.
While legal rights might (or might not) ultimately be affected by these
directives, the effect would be tangential; it would not occur without the
underlying statute.
Arguably, a directive that tells a court to ignore the rule of lenity (or
another constitutionally based directive) in a criminal case could alter the
constitutional right of all individuals to due process. Such a directive would
likely be unconstitutional. However, it would be unconstitutional because of
the due process doctrine, not because of the separation of powers doctrine."
Assuming the directive violated due process, the judiciary would be at liberty,
even required, to ignore or limit the directive, as was the case with the
directive in RICO," because determining whether a statute is constitutional
falls within the province of the judiciary."'
Interpretive directives do little more than tell the judiciary how to interpret these statutes and how to resolve disputes involving conflicts arising under
these statutes. Because these directives do not affect legal rights, they cannot
be legislative acts. Instead, interpreting statutes and resolving disputes are
quintessential judicial acts."' Interpretive directives, which are targeted at this
process, impact the interpretive process. Because the legislature is the wrong
branch to perform a judicial act, interpretive directives violate formalist
separation of powers.
This was exactly the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Evans v. State,3" identified earlier in Part 1. Prior to that case,
the Delaware General Assembly had attempted to "assert[ I its right and
prerogative to be the ultimate arbiter of the intent, meaning, and construction of its laws . .. ." Simply, the state legislature disagreed with the state
360.
The rule of lenity is grounded upon due process concerns. Thus, a statute that directs the
judiciary to ignore the rule of lenity may raise constitutional issues that should not be ignored by the court
simply because the legislature does not want them considered. Cf. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863
F.2d 1125, 1128 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1988) (discussing the federal judiciary's unwillingness to ignore the rule of
lenity in criminal RICO cases despite a statutory directive telling them to do so), ovemded in part by Klehr
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
361.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
From their first year in law school, every budding lawyer learns that the judiciary is the
362.
guardian of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The judiciary
must determine whether the acts of the other branches are constitutional and lawful. See Barak, supra
note 8, at 116.
363.
For a discussion of what acts are judicial under this approach, see supra Part Ill.B.1.c.
872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005) (put curiam).
364.
H.B. 31, § 5402, 143d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., (Del. 2005).
365.
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supreme court's decision in a criminal case.'
So, the Delaware legislature
enacted a general interpretive directive telling its judiciary how to interpret
all Delaware statutes.6 The court was unimpressed and found that the
directive violated Delaware's separation of powers doctrine, for the interpretive directive impermissibly "attempt[ed] to confer upon the General Assembly
fundamental judicial powers."'6 If the legislature disagreed with the court's
decision, its remedy was to rewrite the underlying substantive law, not to
intrude on the court's power to interpret statutory text and impermissibly usurp
the judiciary's function.
In sum, interpretive directives violate formalist separation of powers
because the legislature is performing a judicial act.
2.

Functionalist Separation of Powers

Functionalists would likely find interpretive directives constitutional. Functionalists view the legislative process as a dialogue between the legislature and
judiciary. The two work in partnership to coordinate lawmaking and law interpretation to accomplish the legislature's policy choices."' Interpretive
directives further the partnership and do not unduly encroach on the judiciary's
core function.
The legislature, when it enacts interpretive directives, does not impermissibly encroach on a core function of the judiciary:
Congress may regulate the process of statutory interpretation by
instructing courts to interpret statutes in a certain way. It may direct a
court to interpret a statutory provision narrowly or broadly. It may
instruct the court to interpret certain provisions of the statute in light
of other provisions in that same statute.... Congress can, and often
does, circumscribe judicial creativity in interpretation by fiat.370
Rather, interpretive directives fall within the penumbra of overlapping
functions. "Statutory interpretation is an area in which there is coordinate
responsibility between courts and the political branches.""' Clearly courts
have a role in defining the principles of their interpretive methodology because

366.
See supra Part 1.
367.
Del. H.B. 31, § 5403 (telling Delaware's judiciary (1) to "strictly interpret or construe legislative
intent," (2) to "use the utmost restraint when interpreting or construing the laws of [Delaware]," and (3) to
not "interpret or construe statutes ... when the text [is] clear and unambiguous").
Evans, 872 A.2d at 550.
368.
369.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
370.
Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 767-68.
Bell, supra note 80, at 27.
371.
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[tihe task of interpreting statutes requires the interpreter to
determine the interpretive principles it will employ. . . . However, the

text of the Constitution, in particular the clauses giving Congress the
power to create inferior courts and to make all laws "necessary and
proper" for carrying out expressly granted powers, allows Congress to
prescribe the rules by which courts will decide cases.

. ..

[Interpretive

principles influence the substance of statutes. Congress must retain
some power to address issues of interpretive methodology in order to
protect its ability to establish substantive policies. 2
Under the Constitution, Congress has a role in this area and an interest in
ensuring that its substantive policy choices are furthered. Additionally, "[als
the institution responsible for specifying substantive law, Congress must have the
37
power to exercise some control over interpretive techniques."m
Thus, functionalists would likely find that interpretive directives further the partnership
relationship of the two branches.)
It is perhaps easiest to see how interpretive directives further the dialogue when they are specific to a particular statute. When the legislature
enacts a specific interpretive directive, the legislature is attempting, via the
directive, to make its policy choice for that particular statute clear. In this
way, interpretive directives mirror definitional directives in that the legislature
is simply trying to further its policy choices, not take over the process of
interpretation itself. For example, when a legislature directs the judiciary
to interpret a particular statute broadly to accomplish its remedial purpose,
such a directive informs the court that the legislative purpose for that particular statute was remedial and that the words should be interpreted as broadly as
the court deems reasonable, but no further. The directive indicates the policy
choices the legislature made in regard to that particular issue. Thus, the
directive aids the judiciary in interpreting the statute in a way that best
accomplishes the legislature's specific policy choices. The legislature is not
aggrandizing its role; rather, it is furthering its partnership with the judiciary."'
Some interpretive directives might present separate constitutional
concerns. For example, interpretive directives that tell the judiciary to ignore
372.
Id. at 27-28.
373.
Id.at 30.
374.
But see Araiza, supra note 170, at 1059 (arguing that a provision of an appropriations act
for the Department of the Interior impermissibly intruded on the judiciary's law interpreting function
by deciding that particular conduct satisfied an existing statutory standard).
Moreover, this balance would be furthered if the legislature made the directive presump375.
tive, for the courts would then be freer to work in partnership with the legislature and to apply the
directive only when doing so would further the legislative policy choice. For a discussion of the
difference between presumptive and mandatory directives, see supra Part II.D.
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the rule of lenity or to avoid an interpretation raising a constitutional issue
might raise separate constitutional issues. But the issue is not a separation of
powers issue; rather, the issue involves other provisions in the Constitution,
such as the due process clause. On the one hand, if the legislature directs the
judiciary to ignore the rule of lenity for a particular penal statute, then the legislature has informed the judiciary about its policy choices for that particular
statute. On the other hand, the court must ultimately determine whether
ignoring the rule of lenity in a particular case is constitutional."' The
interpretive directive provides the court with the legislature's preference in
regard to that statute, but Congress cannot direct the judiciary to ignore the
Due Process Clause.
Moreover, functionalists are pragmatists. Allowing these directives likely
promotes legislative and judicial efficiency. The costs of requiring Congress
to amend each and every statute it wishes to amend after the fact could be
high. More legislation fails than ever passes."' In some cases, the legislature
could avoid the need for subsequent amendment by providing an interpretive directive. For example, the legislature could create a clear statement
requirement in an interpretive directive for a particular area of law, say tort
reform. Were it to do so, the judiciary would not need to guess at the legislature's policy choices; those choices would be clear. "[Llegislatively-created
'clear statement' rules, and certain other interpretive provisions are intimately
intertwined with substantive law.""' Moreover, judicial economy could
possibly be furthered because litigation might be avoided if litigants know in
advance how a statute will likely be interpreted."
Because interpretive directives do not impermissibly encroach on a core
function of the judiciary, do not aggrandize the role of the legislature, and do
further judicial and legislative economy, they likely do not violate functionalist
separation of powers.
3.

Preventing Tyranny and Legislative Aggrandizement

Interpretive directives are the only type of directive where the Supreme
Court's approach to separation of powers would likely affect the resolution of
whether they are constitutional. Under formalism, the directives are likely
unconstitutional; under functionalism, the directives are likely constitutional.

376.
377.
378.
379.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 33, at 24.
Bell, supra note 80, at 30-31.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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Thus, the more important question may be whether interpretive directives
increase the possibility of tyranny or legislative aggrandizement.
I suggest that the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional directives lies in the difference between specific interpretive directives,
those that apply to one statute, and general interpretive directives, those that
apply to the entire code. While specific interpretive directives arguably have
the purpose of informing the judiciary about the legislature's goals and policy
choices for a particular statute that a specific legislature enacted, general
interpretive directives have the purpose of telling the judiciary how to interpret
all statutes, those already enacted and those to be enacted, without regard to
specific policy choices. In other words, the purpose of general directives is not
to work harmoniously with the judiciary to make law that furthers specific
policy choices reached via the legislative process. Rather, the purpose of
general interpretive directives is to direct interpretation of all statutes irrespective of the original enacting intent, text, or purpose. Simply put, with
general directives, Congress can no longer say it is trying to further a specific
policy choice. Instead, Congress is acting despite any specific policy choice.
When Congress intrudes on the judicial function in this way, it "extend[s] the
sphere of its activity, and draw[s] all power into its impetuous vortex."so
Perhaps an extreme example will illustrate the distinction most clearly.
What if Congress enacted a statute that simply provided: "Should any statute
ever be challenged, the court shall adopt the executive's interpretation."
With this statute, Congress has taken complete control of the interpretation
process from the judiciary and given it to the executive. Congress is no longer
acting as partner with the judiciary; rather, Congress has become dictator.
The fears of the Framers for protecting individual liberties from congressional
tyranny would be realized. "mhe [whole] power of one department [has been]
exercised by the same hands which possess the [whole] power of another
department. . . ."' The legislature has taken the whole power of the judiciary.
Consider a more realistic scenario. Assume that Congress enacted a
general interpretive directive that required the rule of lenity to be ignored for
all statutes in the penal code.382 Again, Congress is not trying to influence
interpretation to further specific policy choices that it reached only after a
deliberative process. Instead, Congress's main motivation with such a statute
THE FEDERALIsr No. 48, at 274 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
380.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 268 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
381.
Though Congress has not done so, some state legislatures have enacted similar general interpretive
382.
directives. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1999) ("The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to
be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the
fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.").
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is to control the interpretive process: No more can activist judges be lenient
on criminals. While "getting tough on crime" is certainly a policy choice,
Congress cannot possibly be sure that this policy will be furthered in every
case by eliminating the rule of lenity for all criminal cases. It is likely, but not
assured. Therefore, Congress is simply playing the odds.
Similarly, a general directive that says that every statute should be broadly
or narrowly interpreted, though seemingly more benign, suffers the same fate.
When Congress simply includes a specific interpretive directive in one
statute that directs the judiciary to interpret that particular statute broadly or
narrowly, Congress is trying to influence the interpretive outcome regarding
a specific policy choice for that statute. Certainly, process may be impacted,
but impacting process is not the purpose of such a specific interpretive
directive; it is merely tangential. In contrast, if Congress enacted a statute
that directed the judiciary to interpret all existing statutes broadly or narrowly, then Congress would not be trying to influence the interpretation of
particular statutes to further specific policy choices, although that result
might occur. Rather, Congress would be trying to control the judiciary's
method of interpretation regardless of whether a specific policy choice would
ultimately be furthered. Thus, general directives are not legitimate attempts
to influence interpretation to further specific, legislative policy choices.
Rather, they are attempts to control the process of judicial interpretation.
Admittedly, this distinction is highly formalistic and, possibly, unworkable,
though the Court found a similar distinction persuasive in the past. In
Clinton v. City of New York,' the Court rejected the line-item veto, which
was a generally applicable statute. In dissent, Justice Breyer suggested that
"Congress ... could simply have embodied each appropriation in a separate
bill, [then made] each bill subject to a separate Presidential veto."' Why
then, he wondered, would "the Constitution [not permit] Congress to choose
a particular novel means to achieve this same, constitutionally legitimate,
end"?' Answering the question, the majority found the distinction crucial:
"The critical difference between this statute and all of its predecessors .. . is that
unlike any of them, this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change
the text of duly enacted statutes."" The fact that the Court has accepted
such a distinction in the past leaves the possibility that it might do so again.

383.

524 U.S. 417 (1998).

384.

Id. at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

385.
386.

Id.
Id. at 446-47.
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Candidly, Congress could theoretically defeat the distinction altogether.
For example, Congress could add the identical interpretive directive to every
new or existing statute. Notably, Congress is likely to be unsuccessful in any such
effort, for it is difficult to enact new legislation, let alone amend every
existing statute."' But, even if Congress were successful in this effort, the
judiciary could, at least, have some assurance that Congress might have actually
considered the effect of such a directive on the specific policy choices for
each affected statute. In other words, to enact one directive for every
statute, Congress would theoretically debate, evaluate, and consider whether
such a directive would be appropriate for that particular statute and its
underlying policy choices. With general interpretive directives, there are no
such assurances.
In summary, specific interpretive directives do not appear to violate
separation of powers. By requiring Congress to enact each directive while considering the policy objectives for a particular statute, the Court can ensure
that Congress is merely trying to influence interpretation to further those
objectives rather than impermissibly intrude into the judicial sphere. In
contrast, general interpretive directives are problematic, at best. They allow
the legislature to take over the interpretive process, not to promote specific
policy objectives, but rather to control the interpretation process. As such,
they concentrate power in the legislature's hands, thereby threatening tyranny.
CONCLUSION
Predicting whether the Court will find that statutory directives violate
separation of powers is challenging, especially given that the Court's jurisprudence in the area of separation of powers has been inconsistent, at best. The
Court has used the formalist approach to invalidate some power-sharing
distributions between the legislature and executive-such as the line-item
and legislative veto."' Contrariwise, the Court has used the functionalist
approach to validate other, but not all, power-sharing distributions involving

To simplify this process, Congress could instead pass an omnibus statute that said, "All
387.
statutes passed during this session of the legislature are deemed to include the following interpretive
directive . . . ." The omnibus statute would still be troubling. It is really no more than a disguised
general interpretive directive because the result is the same: Congress need not actually debate,
evaluate, and consider every affected statute.
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421 (holding that the line-item veto violated separation of
388.
powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-58 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto violated
separation of powers); Magill, supra note 104, at 609-10. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.l.a.
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the judiciary and executive-such as the independent counsel arrangements
and the exercise of adjudicatory authority by administrative agencies." The
Court's mixed jurisprudence demonstrates that neither approach garners a
clear majority. For this reason, the constitutionality of statutory directives
must be analyzed under both approaches: formalism and functionalism.
Yet neither formalism nor functionalism completely answers the question
of whether Congress can constitutionally enact statutes that tell the judiciary
how to interpret statutes. For definitional and theoretical directives, the
approach seems irrelevant: Under either approach the former are constitutional while the latter are likely unconstitutional. But the choice of approach
appears to matter for interpretive directives: They are unconstitutional under
formalism but constitutional under functionalism. Hence, approach cannot
completely resolve the constitutional question.
Concerns with tyranny and legislative aggrandizement underlie both
approaches to separation of powers. With these concerns informing the discussion, I conclude that Congress has the constitutional power to enact
directives that attempt to influence statutory interpretation to further specific
policy objectives, but does not have the constitutional power to enact
directives that attempt to control the process of interpretation irrespective of
policy objectives. When Congress crosses the line from helping the judiciary
determine what the law means, to taking control of the judiciary's function, it
violates separation of powers by aggrandizing itself and providing the potential
for tyranny. In other words, Congress unconstitutionally becomes master of
the judiciary.
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Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988) (holding that the independent counsel
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Magill, supra note 104, at 609-10.

